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I. INTRODUCTION  
The 1992 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam states in Article 70 
that "the citizen shall enjoy freedom of belief and of religion; he can follow any religion 
... All religions are equal before the law."  The article concludes with the negating caveat, 
"No one can violate freedom of belief and of religion; nor can anyone misuse beliefs and 
religions to contravene the law and State policies."  The broad language of the 
constitution authorizes the Vietnamese government under the leadership of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) to suppress and control any religion or belief the 
government deems contravenes the laws of Vietnam, poses a threat to internal stability, 
or potential delegitimizes the leading position of the VCP in Vietnamese society.  In 
Vietnam, any organizations autonomous from the VCP, particularly religious ones, 
threaten the VCP’s legitimacy and ability to implement policy with impunity.  To prevent 
such potential threats from civil society and ensure the country progresses in the direction 
the VCP leads, the VCP must continue to co-opt and maintain control of civil society—
particularly religion.1   
In the court of international opinion and perception, Vietnam's methods of 
restricting and controlling religions often contravene basic human and civil rights.2  As 
Vietnam moves away from isolationism and becomes more integrated into both the world 
economy and community, Vietnam's development becomes more subject to international 
norms and opinion.  This begs the question:  What effect will Vietnam’s further 
                                                 
1 Civil society consists of autonomous and independent institutions which operate between the people 
and the government.  The role of civil society is to allow citizens to express their interests, concerns, and 
ideas; to positively shape their community, and to check authority of the state and hold it accountable.  
Civil society includes many groups: civic, issue-oriented, educational, health, and religious to name a few.  
See Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, “An Approach for Analyzing State-Society Relations in Vietnam,” Sojourn: 
Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 16 (2001), 241; Larry Diamond, Development Democracy: 
Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 221; and Suchit 
Bunbongkarn, “The Role of Civil Society in Democratic Consolidation in Asia,” The Asia-Pacific: A 
Region in Transition, 138; available from http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/ SASAP Response 
030320/Regionalfinal.htm; internet; accessed 15 July 2004.  
2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nation’s International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights both emphatically state that everyone has the right to freedom of religion.  
Furthermore, both declarations state that individuals have the right in public or in private to worship, 
observe, and practice their chosen religion.  For the Universal Declaration of Human Rights see article 18; 
viewed at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights/html; accessed on 11 March 2005.  For the United Nation’s 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights see Part III, article 18; viewed at http://www.ibiblio. 
org/ais/iccpr.htm; viewed on 11 March 2005. 
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integration into the world economy and community have on Vietnam’s restrictions on 
religious institutions and control of religious freedom?  To this end, my thesis will 
explore how globalization affects Vietnam’s view and treatment of religion in Vietnam.  
In a larger context, my thesis will address how and why the conditions of globalization 
foster increased liberalism and the latent development of civil society.   
To understand the implications of globalization for religion in Vietnam, we must 
first define globalization.  Joseph Nye defined globalization as “the condition of networks 
of worldwide interdependence.”3  The concept of “worldwide interdependence” is readily 
understood in the context of international trade.  For example, country A may depend on 
country B for a specific product while country B on the other hand depends on country A 
for a different product.  Thus, the shared dependence upon one another creates a 
condition of interdependence.  On a larger scale, the complexity of international trade 
results in more interdependence.  The networks can be trade networks, security networks, 
special interests networks, or a host of other areas in which countries may share common 
interests.    
Contemporary global networks are distinguished from past conditions of 
globalization in that modern-day networks affect and involve more “people from more 
regions and social classes.”4  Technological innovations such as air travel, 
telecommunications, the computer, and most recently the internet have facilitated and 
empowered the access of previously less powerful actors in the arenas of international 
finance, economic, and transnational interest groups.  The increased speed of 
communications, the increased numbers of connections between societies and interests 
groups, and the increased complexity of these connections are indicative of contemporary 
globalization.5  Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye appropriately described globalization as 
it exists today as “complex interdependence.”6   
                                                 
3 Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t go it 
Alone (Oxford University Press, 2002), 78 – 88. 
4 Ibid, 78.  
5 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed.  (Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1989), 23.  Keohane and Nye argue that “complex interdependence” is the opposite of realism.  
I modify this somewhat and use complex interdependence to serve as the opposite of autarky.   
6 Ibid, 23 -36.   
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Globalization under the conditions of complex interdependence holds significant 
implications for domestic and international actors.  The conditions of complex 
interdependence change the amount and nature of power that states can wield against 
other states and against their own societies.7  Before a domestic or foreign policy is 
implemented, a state in a complex interdependent world must take into consideration how 
other actors with which it has an interdependent relationship may react to the policy.  In 
many instances for a state to gain and maintain access to certain trade or security benefits 
enjoyed by members of an international and interdependent trade or security network, 
that state must comply with the groups’ accepted norms of behavior.  For example, to 
access the trade benefits that come from acceding to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), a state must accept, implement, and follow the financial and legal norms and 
standards of the WTO.  State policy that deviates from these norms and standards could 
likely result in sanctions or some other undesirable consequence.  Thus, in a complex 
interdependent system, states have strong incentives to try to maximize their interest by 
adapting to and adhering to international and global norms.  Thus it logically follows that 
as Vietnam seeks entry into such networks it will have to take into account their 
international norms and standards.  What follows is an examination of the manner in 
which Vietnam has done this and its impact on religion.      
 
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Since the introduction of Doi Moi, the end of the Cold War, and the increase in 
the “speed and thickness” of globalization, the VCP has sought to open and develop its 
economy in order to maintain its hold on domestic power.8  As the VCP has sought to 
integrate Vietnam’s economy into the international economy, become a more recognized 
member of international society, and reap the benefits from participation in the 
international system, it has slowly and gradually acquiesced to international pressures and 
                                                 
7 Keohane and Nye, 30-31. 
8 Nye, 87.  “Thickness” refers to the increase of interconnections in the global setting while 
“quickness” refers to the increased speed at which events in one part of the global network can affect 
another part.   
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begun accepting and incorporating internationally accepted norms.9  For Vietnam and 
other autocratic states, joining liberal international economic institutions has the potential 
to slowly foster liberalization. 
If this holds true, then in today's world of complex interdependence, Vietnam 
should be increasingly less inclined to blatantly contravene the internationally accepted 
norms of religious freedom.  Furthermore, as Vietnam moves from an autarkic position 
vis-à-vis the international community to a complex interdependent one, its restrictions 
against and control over religious institutions should decrease.  The overall degree of 
religious freedom enjoyed by Vietnamese should increase as a result of Vietnam’s 
position vis-à-vis the international community and degree of interdependence with that 
community.  Under the conditions of globalization and complex interdependency, it 
becomes less in the interests of the VCP to restrict and control religious institutions in the 
same manner as during previous states of autarky. 
 
B. EVOLUTION OF VIETNAM’S REGIME TYPE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
A GLOBALIZING WORLD 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a one-party state structured after what T. H. 
Rigby has called “mono-organizational socialism.”10  The VCP organizes Vietnamese 
society such that all aspects of society fall under the control and domination of the party 
structure.  However, empirical cases of mono-organizational socialism such as the Soviet 
Union, the People’s Republic of China, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
to name just a few, show an array of variance in mono-organizational socialism.  Mono-
organizational socialism remains an important and germane concept to understanding 
how the VCP continues to dominate Vietnamese society, however, a more concise and 




                                                 
9 Thomas Risse, “International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior 
in the Human Rights Area,” in Politics & Society 27 (December 1999): 529. 
10 T. H. Rigby,  “Mono-Organizational Socialism and the Civil Society” in The Transition from 
Socialism: State and Civil Society in the USSR, Chadran Kukathas, David W. Lovell and William Maley 
eds. (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1991), 111-112.   
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Table 1. Major Modern Regime Ideal Types and Their Defining Characteristics.11
 
Characteristic Authoritarianism Totalitarianism Post-totalitarianism Sultanism 
Pluralism Limited but not 
responsive pluralism.  
Allows for limited 
civil society. 
 
No (monocratic) Limited but not responsive 
semi-pluralism (‘parallel 
culture’, ‘second 
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Stepan.12  They distinguish the following four types of non-democratic political systems: 
Authoritarianism, Totalitarianism, Post-totalitarianism, and Sultanism (See table 1). 
Vietnam does not completely fit the characteristics of any one typology.  
However, out of the four, Vietnam most reflects post-totalitarianism in three ways.  First, 
in post-totalitarianism an “important ideological legacy” continues that cannot be ignored 
or questioned officially.  However, there is a weakening of actual belief in the ideology 
as the foundation of the regime’s legitimacy.  Thus regimes will tend to base their 
legitimacy on performance criteria.13  As will be discussed in chapter two, in 1986 
Vietnam ideologically veered away from communism by embracing market reforms—the 
                                                 
11 Table manipulated and simplified by author.  Table and data derived from Linz and Stepan, 
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 44-45. 
12 Juan Linz and Albert Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), 49. 
13 Ibid, 49. 
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so called Doi Moi reforms.14  Presently, Vietnam continues to proclaim allegiance to 
Marxism-Leninism as its guiding ideology.15  However, in reality, the VCP bases its 
legitimacy on a variety of potential sources, most notably economic development and the 
party’s role in staging a successful indigenous revolutionary struggle for independence 
and unification.  
Second, post-totalitarianism posits that the “means of mobilization still 
dominate,” yet they have lost their intensity.16  In Vietnam the VCP still has the capacity 
to mobilize society for rallies or campaigns; yet today, Vietnamese are more concerned 
with personal economic betterment than the government’s latest campaign to end “social 
evils.”17  Mobilization efforts have become ritualized, lacking the fervor and devotion to 
a cause they once exhibited during wars with France and America.  Finally, in post-
totalitarianism there is a “disjunction between ideological claims and reality.”  The VCP 
publicly lauds the glories of communism and its primary role in guiding the country and 
society.  In reality, Vietnam’s interests are today shaped more by global economic 
issues.18  
A limited nascent civil society exists in post-totalitarian Vietnam.19  The VCP 
fears the spread of civil society with its latent potential to create political pressure for 
                                                 
14 The Sixth Communist Party Congress instituted Doi Moi (renovation) in December 1986 as a 
program to reform and revitalize Vietnam’s stagnant economy.  See, Viet D. Dinh, “Financial Reform and 
Economic Development in Vietnam,” Law and Policy in International Business 28 (1997): 857.  
15 Marxism-Leninism includes the dictatorship of the proletariat, socialist ownership of the means of 
production, class struggle, collectivization, leading role of the communist party, and the principle of 
democratic centralism.  For additional information of Marxism-Leninism.  See Robert C. Tucker, The 
Marxian Revolution Idea (New York: Norton & Company, 1969), passim 54-84.  
16 Linz and Stepan, 49. 
17 Robert Templer, Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam (New York: Penguin Books, 
1998), 250-251. 
18 Adam Fforde and Stefan de Vylder, From Plan to Market: The Economic Transition in Vietnam 
(Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1996), 303-307; Henry Kamm, Dragon Ascending: Vietnam and the 
Vietnamese (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1996), 203-210; and Templer, 352-355.  
19 Linz and Stepan, 43.  Since the Doi Moi reforms were initiated in 1986, Vietnam’s samizdat 
literature has flourished.  See Zachary Abuza, Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 139-142.     
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reform, liberalization, and possible democratic usurpation of the Party’s control.20  
Among the different parts of civil society, religion is a key potential threat to the VCP’s 
monopoly hold on power.  The very nature of religion runs counter to the VCP’s 
dominance in guiding all aspects of society to include ideology, social organizations, 
education, and social work.  Religion in Vietnam is one of the most important social 
influences in society.21  Consequently, unless the doctrine and preaching of a religion is 
controlled or co-opted by the VCP, it is a potential threat to the VCP’s quest to control all 
aspects of society.  Religious institutions also have the inherent proclivity to organize and 
guide the beliefs of its adherents.  Thus, for the VCP, religious institutions have a 
capacity to become the focus of political opposition.22  Globalization increases religious 
groups’ ability to network internationally, which in turn exacerbates the threat of 
religious institutions advocating an agenda that contradicts VCP’s party line.  As 
religious groups interact more, become more interconnected, and identify more with the 
larger international community of their faith they are increasingly exposed to religious 
agendas which advocate tenets and doctrines that are likely to be contrary to the VCP 
line.   
Restrictions and control of religious institutions have become more complex as 
Vietnam emerged from geopolitical autarky (1976 to 1986) into a period of increasing 
global interdependence (1987 to present).  The desperate social and economic situations 
in Vietnam from 1975 to 1986 threatened to delegitimize the VCP.23  The leadership of 
                                                 
20 Abuza, 9-15.  Abuza makes the argument that Vietnam has not democratized like many former 
communist states because it has prevented “agents of change” or groups in civil society from emerging and 
demanding change.  See also Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnamese Foreign Policy: Multilateralism and the 
Threat of Peaceful Evolution,” in Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition, eds. Ramses Amer and Carlyle 
A. Thayer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 13-16. 
21 Charles F. Keyes, The Golden Peninsula: Culture and Adaptation in Mainland Southeast Asia 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), passim 181-245. 
22 Shaun Kingsley Malarney, “Return to the Past? Dynamics of Contemporary Religious and Ritual 
Transformation,” in Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society, ed. Hy V. Luong (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003), 226.  In 
fact, recent cases of democratization in East Europe (Poland and East Germany) and Asia (Korea and the 
Philippines) in the 1980s show that religious organizations in general and Christian churches in particular 
often are at the center of civil society protest against autocratic rule.  See Diamond, 235–236.    
23 Gabriel Kolko, Vietnam: Anatomy of a Peace (New York: Routledge, 1997), 3-6.  For details on 
Vietnam’s social and economic failures see Nguyen Van Canh, Vietnam Under Communism: 1975-1982 
(Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), passim, and especially 259 – 260. 
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the VCP recognized that the Party had to reform its economic policies to maintain 
legitimacy in order to preserve its power. 
  During the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986, the VCP approved the 
policy of Doi Moi (economic renovation).  With the ongoing reforms initiated by Doi 
Moi, the VCP began basing its legitimacy on the performance of the market and not the 
infallibility of Marxist-Leninist ideology.  The implementation of Doi Moi also led to the 
redirection of Vietnam’s foreign and economic policy focus.  Doi Moi effectively shifted 
Vietnam out its autarkic geopolitical existence into the social, economic, and geopolitical 
dynamics of twentieth-first century globalization.  
It is in this context that recent scholarship on Vietnam has examined the changes 
that have taken place as a result of the Doi Moi reforms in a more interdependent regional 
and global economy.  Carlye Thayer argues that the reform process in Vietnam post-Doi 
Moi has resulted in the relaxation of Vietnam’s mono-organizational “grip” on society 
and that a nascent civil society is emerging.24  Melanie Beresford indicates that the VCP 
has been responsive to pressures from below and recognizes the “existence of 
independent sources of political power” emerging in Vietnamese society.25  Shaun 
Malarney has argued that in the realm of post-socialist political culture, Vietnam is 
“moving down the path of pluralization.”26  He suggests that since the mid-1980’s the 
VCP has relaxed its control over cultural affairs and that concurrently, “a blossoming of 
religion has occurred.”27  Gareth Porter has gone further, arguing that “Vietnamese 
society has been undergoing a process of creeping pluralism which is bound to accelerate 
in the 1990s.”28  Mandy Thomas asserted that the state’s ability to determine and control 
                                                 
24 Carlyle A. Thayer, “Political Reform in Vietnam: Doi Moi and the Emergence of Civil Society,” in 
The Development of Civil Society in Communist Systems, ed. Robert F. Miller (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1992), 111-112. 
25 Melanie Beresford, National Unification and Economic Development in Vietnam (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1989), 116-118.    
26 Shaun  Kingsley Malarney, “Culture, Virtue, And Political Transformation In Contemporary 
Northern Viet Nam,” The Journal of Asian Studies 56 (November 1997): 918. 
27 Shaun Kingsley Malarney, Return to the Past? Dynamics of Contemporary Religious and Ritual 
Transformation, in “Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a Transforming Society,” ed. Hy V. Luong (New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003), 
225. 
28 Gareth Porter, Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993), 164.  
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Vietnamese society has been dwindling since the late 1980s.29  She argues the VCP can 
still mobilize crowds and shape some aspects of cultural life, but cannot prevent 
unofficial and even unauthorized crowds, determine popular entertainment or who 
becomes national celebrities.  Other scholars have made similar connections between 
reforms introduced from Doi Moi and pressures from various parts of society resulting in 
salient policy changes.30
This literature elucidates how and why Vietnam implemented the Doi Moi 
reforms.  The literature also shows how the Doi Moi reforms resulted in Vietnam 
emerging from autarky and entering globalization.  The literature does not however, 
satisfactorily elucidate the effects and impacts of the external influences of globalization 
on post-Doi Moi Vietnam.     
I propose to bridge this gap in the literature by examining the effect Vietnam’s 
further integration into globalization has had on religious freedom in Vietnam.  In a 
broader context, I examine the effects of globalization on civil society in states led by 
autocratic governments.  Additionally, in light of the implications of globalization on 
religion, I conclude by offering policy recommendations for the United States with regard 
to Vietnam and autocratic regimes in general.     
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To examine the implications of globalization on religion in Vietnam, I will use a 
case study which examines the Catholic Church in Vietnam from 1975 to present.  I have 
selected the Catholic Church over other religious groups in Vietnam for two primary 
reasons.  First, the preponderance of Catholics in Vietnam are ethnic Vietnamese and are 
not viewed as a group with separatists potential, as some Protestants are.  Many of the 
marginalized ethnic minority groups living in Vietnam’s central highlands have large 
Protestants populations.  The Vietnamese government views many of these ethnic 
minority Protestants church’s as aiding and abetting separatists and anti-government 
                                                 
29 Mandy Thomas, “Public Spaces/Public Disgraces: Crowds and the State in Contemporary 
Vietnam,” Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 16 (2001): 306-307.   
30 See Adam Fforde, The Agrarian Question in North Vietnam 1974-79—A Study of Cooperator 
Resistance to State Policy (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), 203-205; and Benedict Kerkvliet, “Village-
State Relations in Vietnam: The Effect of Everyday Politics on Decollectivization,” Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 54 (May 1995): 396-418. 
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agendas.  Therefore, among Protestants in Vietnam it is problematic in determining 
whether restrictive or suppressive religious policies are inspired to curb separatist 
activity, reflect a general anti-religious party line, or are simply an extension of existing 
Vietnamese discriminatory practices towards ethnic minority groups.  Furthermore, there 
are many differences among Protestantism’s many sects. The experiences and treatment 
received by one Protestant church can vary considerably to that of other Protestant 
church.  A case study on Protestantism presents too many variables to control for, given 
space and research limitations. The study of Catholics in Vietnam does not present any of 
these problems to the degree Protestants does.    
The second primary reason for selecting the Catholic Church in Vietnam as my 
case study is largely utilitarian: comparatively, there is a wealth of available sources.  The 
Buddhist, Hoa Hoa, and Cao Dai religions all have intriguing histories; however, in each 
case I faced a dearth of sources to which I could access and read in English.  In addition 
to availability of sources, the Catholic Church was an obvious choice for my case study 
because of the Church’s history in Vietnam, its demographics, and the relationship of the 
Vietnamese Catholic Church to the universal Catholic Church headquartered at the 
Vatican.   
The case study of the Catholic Church in Vietnam examines Vietnam’s 
interactions, suppression, restrictions, and control of the Catholic Church during 
Vietnam’s period of autarky from 1975 to 1986 and increased interdependence from 1987 
to present.  The independent variable is Vietnam’s degree of international 
interdependence and the dependent variable is the Catholic Church’s degree of freedom 
in Vietnam.  Vietnam’s view and treatment of the Catholic Church are the indicators used 
to determine the Catholic Church’s degree of religious freedom during Vietnam’s period 
of autarky compared to its period of global interdependence.    
Chapter two accomplishes three tasks.  First, it provides the historical background 
for my study of the Catholic Church in Vietnam.  Second, it establish the foundation for 
my first intervening variable—Vietnam’s view of the Catholic Church—by examining 
the VCP’s view of religion and religious institutions in Vietnamese society.  Finally, 
chapter two lays out the independent variable—Vietnam’s degree of international 
interdependence—by examining Vietnam’s isolation during the period of autarky from 
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1975 to 1986 and by examining Vietnam’s increased international interdependence from 
1987 to 2004.   
Chapter three shows how during Vietnam’s period of autarky, the Catholic 
Church was suppressed, severely restricted, and controlled by Vietnam’s VCP-led 
government.  It uses Vietnam’s view and treatment of the Catholic Church as the primary 
indicators to elucidate the Catholic Church’s low degree of religious freedom during this 
period.  The chapter focuses on post-reunification suppression of the Catholic Church and 
Vietnamese laws and regulations used to restrict and control the Church.     
Chapter four looks at Vietnam’s view and treatment of the Catholic Church 
Vietnam’s period of increased international interdependence.  The chapter examines 
official government statements on the Church, engagement with the Vatican, status of 
priests, Church activity levels, the Church’s societal involvement, changes in government 
regulations, and trends in international reports on religion in Vietnam.  The purpose of 
this chapter is to elucidate changes to the indicators of the Catholic Church’s degree of 
religious freedom in Vietnam.  The impact and implications of these changes is discussed 
in the last chapter. 
Chapter five presents my case study’s conclusion on the Catholic Church in 
Vietnam.  It shows that the Catholic Church’s overall degree of religious freedom was 
greater during Vietnam’s period of international integration than during its period of 
autarky.  The pressures that global engagement and interdependence bring to bear on 
nations tend to foster increased levels increased levels of liberalization and civil society.  
 
D. SOURCES 
This thesis draws from contemporary scholarly literature, government and 
nongovernmental organizations’ documents, and news reports to establish a historical, 
economic, and geopolitical context upon which to frame the case study.  I use a wealth of 
reports on the status of religion in Vietnam and Vietnam’s global integration from such 
sources as the United States government, international human rights groups, international 
economic organizations, and other international nongovernmental organizations.  To 
elucidate the more nuanced details of the case study, I draw from press releases and 
official statements from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.  I also draw heavily from 
 11
various media sources that specialize in Catholic Church news.  Finally, I draw from the 
reports of numerous human rights and religious freedom organizations. 
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II. HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND GEOPOLITICAL 
CONTEXT 
This chapter begins with the historical background of Catholicism in Vietnam 
through 1975—the year my study begins—in order to establish a historical content in 
which to explore why the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) views religious 
institutions, the Catholic Church in particular, with suspicion and as a threat to the Party’s 
dominance and control of society and government.  Next, I lay the foundation for my 
analysis of the methods and policies used by the VCP to suppress, co-opt, and control 
religions.  Finally, I examine how and why the VCP transitioned from a closed autarkic 
outlook to an outlook open to globalization and international interdependence. 
 
A. CATHOLICISM IN VIETNAM THROUGH 1975 
Catholicism has existed in Vietnam for over 400 years.  French Jesuit Father 
Alexander de Rhodes established the Catholic mission in Vietnam in 1627.  Christianity 
provided an alternative from the rigid strictures of a hierarchal Confucian society.  
Catholicism held the appeal of salvation and community for many poor Vietnamese 
marginalized by the Confusion elite.31  By 1663, the Catholic population in the north hit 
200,000—approximately 10 percent of the northern population.32  The rapid spread of 
Catholicism worried Vietnamese rulers.  They viewed Catholicism as an ideological 
threat to the existing Confucian order.  Vietnamese rulers were also concerned about 
Catholicism’s latent potential to introduce negative foreign influences and domination to 
Vietnam.  Consequently, beginning in the seventeenth century, Vietnamese rulers began 
persecuting and banning Catholics.33  In response to reports of both persecution and 
missionary success, the Pope authorized the formation of the Society of Foreign Missions 
in France in 1662 to engage in missionary work in Vietnam.   
The Church continued to grow into the eighteenth century.  By 1756, there were 
300,000 members.  Most members lived in rural areas where Confucianism was not as 
                                                 
31 Templer, 263-264. 
32 Piero Gheddo, The Cross and the Bo-Tree: Catholics and Buddhists in Vietnam (New York: Sheed 
and Ward, 1970), 4. 
33 Templer, 263. 
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strong as in the urban areas.34  Missionaries took advantage of the widespread political 
turmoil of the eighteenth century to reach out to the poor, disenfranchised, and those 
disillusioned with the ruler’s efforts to bolster Confucianism.35
Towards the end of the eighteenth century as Tay Son Rebellion forces threatened 
to conquer all of Vietnam, a French Catholic priest aided the Nguyen court to turn the 
tides of the rebellion in favor of the Nguyen Lords.36  In return for help rendered during 
the rebellion, the first Nguyen emperor, Gia Long, (r. 1802-1820) provided nominal 
protection for missionary work.  Subsequent Nguyen emperors reversed the court’s 
position and implemented severe anti-Catholic persecution and suppression campaigns 
against both Vietnamese Catholics and foreign missionaries.37  The severe persecution 
during the nineteenth century incited missionary fervor in France.  This fervor led to a 
dramatic increase in attention and support in France for missionary efforts in Vietnam.38  
The dramatic nation-wide increase in attention and support in France for missionary work 
in Vietnam resulted in an increase in conversions in spite of persecutions.39  It also led to 
French protection of foreign missionaries which then resulted in the pretext for French 
intervention and eventual colonialization of Vietnam in 1883.  This connection between 
French Catholic missionaries and the subtle introduction of French colonization tainted 
the Church’s credibility in the eyes of the Nguyen and later Communist rulers.    
As the southern portion of Vietnam, Cochin China, became a French colony in 
1859, the Vietnamese’s worst fears about Catholicism came to pass—Catholicism led to 
foreign domination.  By 1883, France absorbed the remaining portions of Vietnam, 
Annam-central Vietnam and Tonkin-north Vietnam, as French protectorates.  In Tonkin, 
                                                 
34 Templer, 263..  
35 Barbara Watson Andaya and Yoneo Ishii, “Religious Development in Southeast Asia, c. 1500-
1800,” in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 1, part 2, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 213. 
36 For information of this see Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 
75-76; Nicolas Tarling, “The Establishment of the Colonial Regimes,” in The Cambridge History of 
Southeast Asia, vol. 2, part 1, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 38. 
37 For more information on the Nguyen persecutions against Catholics see Gheddo, 9; Templer, 264. 
38 Nola Cooke, “Early Nineteenth-Century Vietnamese Catholics and Others in the Pages of the 
Annales de la Propagation de la Foi,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 35 (June 2004): 264, 273-275. 
 
39 There were 310,000 converts in 1800; 420,000 in 1840; 708,000 in 1890.  See Gheddo, 13-15. 
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nationalistic French priests directly aided France in establishing its dominance in 
Vietnam.40  During uprisings against French subjugation, many Vietnamese Catholics 
were targeted as French loyalist.  When in fact, many Catholics were ardent nationalists, 
actively opposed foreign domination, and joined Catholic dominated nationalistic 
movements.41
During World War II (1941-1945) many Catholic nationalists supported 
resistance efforts against the Japanese.  When Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam’s 
independence after World War Two on September 2, 1945, Catholics initially joined 
Ho’s government.  After France attempted to reassert colonial control beginning in 
October 1945, Catholics joined with the Viet Minh in a united front to fight for 
independence against the French.  The spirit of this unity was evident in a letter published 
in 1945 by Vietnamese Catholic Bishops to the Christian world calling for their support 
in the Vietnamese people’s effort to preserve independence from France.42  Collaboration 
between the Catholic Church and the Communist-led Viet Minh anti-French forces 
culminated in early 1950 with the establishment in North Vietnam of a United Catholics 
Committee designed to bring together priest and lay Catholics to work with Ho Chi 
Minh’s liberation movement against France.43  
Shortly after the formation of the committee, however, the relationship between 
the Catholic Church in Vietnam and communist-led liberation forces turned antagonistic.  
This occurred for two main reasons.  First, beginning in 1950, the intentions of the 
Communist-led Viet Minh became clear to the Catholics.  The Viet Minh intended to 
introduce Communism as a state ideology and soul-guiding force in society.  The Viet 
Minh began to consolidate power and establish undisputed domination by eliminating all 
other non-communist resistance forces—including the Catholic-led groups.  The common 
ground of nationalism crumbled as the Viet Minh began to establish socialist societies 
                                                 
40 A good example of this can be seen in the ministry of the Vicar Apostolic of West Tonkin, Paul 
Puginier, who stated in the 1870s, “there are good reasons to hope that within thirty years, virtually all of 
Tonkin will be Christian, that is to say French.”  For more details see Jean Michaud, “French Missionary 
Expansion in Colonial Upper Tonkin,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 35 (June 2004): 293-297. 
41Gheddo, 24.  
42 George Evers, “Human Rights in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam—Religious Freedom,” 
Pontifical Mission Society: Human Rights Office [report on-line] <http://wwwmissio-
aachen.de/humanrights>; accessed on 5 November 2004, page 8. 
43 Ibid. 
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and communist governments in Viet Minh controlled areas.  The second main reason was 
Pope Pius XII.  With the threat of Communist domination in Eastern Europe, Pope Pius 
XII led the Church against “atheistic Communism” and pursed a policy of zero 
compromise or appeasement with Communists.44  The Pope’s animosity towards 
Communism culminated in a 1949-decree in which he forbade Catholics in all countries 
to vote for Communist parties or cooperate with them in any way.  The consequence for 
violating this decree was excommunication.45  In response to the Pope’s position on 
Communism, in 1951, Vietnamese bishops published a letter warning their flock about 
“atheistic Communism.”46   Furthermore, the letter directly forbade all Vietnamese 
Catholics from either joining or cooperating with communist organizations.47
Particularly for Catholics in the north, Communism became the greater of two 
evils; French colonization being the other.  Two of the largest dioceses in Hanoi 
organized political associations with militias that actively fought against the Communists 
until 1954.  Bishop Pham Ngoc Chi of Bui Chu Diocese formed an armed organization to 
fight against both the French and the Communists.48  
In the end, the communist-led Viet Minh forces defeated the French.  The Geneva 
Conference in 1954 secured Vietnam’s independence from France, but also left the nation 
split at the seventeenth parallel: the communist-led Democratic Republic in the North and 
the American-backed Republic of Vietnam in the South.  The establishment of a 
communist government in the north led to an exodus of northern Catholics to the South.  
Ten of the twelve Vietnamese bishops, seven hundred priests, and close to 700,000 
Catholics moved from the North to the South.49  The 300,000 Catholics who stayed 
                                                 
44 Nicholas Cheetham, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the Popes from St. Peter to John Paul II 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1983), 290.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Gheddo, 46. 
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Sep 1988): 6. 
48 Stephen Denney, “The Catholic Church in Vietnam,” in Catholicism and Politics in Communist 
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behind faced persecution, repression, and government control of their church and 
religion.50    
The newly established Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) viewed the 
Catholic Church with great suspect and distrust.  The Catholic Church was highly 
organized, hieratical, and had an agenda anathematic from the Communist party.51  
Furthermore, the Catholic Church had indirect ties to the former imperialist power.  The 
Communist party viewed Catholicism as a threat and harmful to their efforts to build their 
one-party socialist state.52
In June 1955, the DRV issued a decree on religion which gave “freedom of 
religion” premised upon many restrictions.  For example, the decree stated: 
Every citizen is granted religious freedom.  Nobody has the right to 
infringe on this freedom.  Every citizen has the right to profess and 
propagate any religion he wishes, provided such religion is not detrimental 
to the independence, national freedom, social order and laws of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.53
The broad language of this decree essentially gave the DRV government the ability to 
restrict and control a religion if it did not support the DRV’s agenda.  Article 14 of the 
decree elucidates the DRV’s method of co-opting religion.  It discusses the role and 
responsibility religion and religious institutions have to support the state.  Article 14 
states, “When worshipping ministers of the religion preach, they are obliged to inspire in 
the faithful a sense of patriotism, an awareness of their civic duties and respect for the 
democratic authorities and the laws of the People’s Republic.”54
Shortly after the DRV’s decree on religion was issued, the DRV formed the 
Liaison Committee of Patriotic and Peace-loving Catholics.  This organization was 
designed to propagate the official government policy towards Catholics and mobilize 
                                                 
50 Evers, 10. 
51 A communist party has existed continuously in Vietnam since 1930.   However, it has gone by three 
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Catholics to support the new regime.55  In addition to trying to control and co-opt the 
Church’s agenda and doctrine to suit the Party’s ideology and agenda, the DRV also 
attempted to break the Church off from the Vatican.  Bishops and priests were prevented 
from sending or receiving letters directly to and from the Vatican.56  Furthermore, the 
DRV confiscated all Church property, banned religious press, and nationalized all 
Catholic elementary and secondary schools.57  Finally, the DRV took control of 
seminaries and Catholic schools by declaring only Marxist ideology was allowed to be 
taught.  This prevented the Catholics in the North from attending seminary and 
replenishing priests.   
The pattern of repression, persecution, and co-optation experienced by the 
Catholic Church in the North after 1954 established the basic pattern followed by the 
VCP against the Catholic Church in the South after 1975. However, before 1975, the 
Catholic Church fared much better in the newly established Republic of Vietnam (RVN) 
in the South.58   
South Vietnamese Catholics maintained strong ties to the Vatican.  Vietnamese 
Bishops from the RVN played an active role in the historic Vatican II Council.59  
Beginning with the Republic of Vietnam’s first president, Ngo Dinh Diem—a staunch 
Catholic—Catholics played a disproportionately large role in the RVN’s government and 
military.  For example, in 1960, 66 percent of the senators, 30 percent of the Members of 
Parliament, 21 percent of the high ranking military officers, and all key cabinet positions 
were Catholics.60  Catholics only consisted of 7 percent of the total population of the 
South.  Up until the communist victory over the South in 1975, Catholics continued to 
take an active part in politics and social issues in the RVN.       
                                                 
55 Denney, 272. 
56 Ibid, 84. 
57 Evers, 11. 
58 The Republic of Vietnam existed from 22 October 1955 to 30 April 1975. 
59 The Vatican II Council was held at the Vatican from 1962 to 1965.  The Council brought about 
important reforms to the Catholic Church, making the Church less esoteric by adapting the Church to 
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60 Evers, 12. 
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The above historical overview of the Catholic Church in Vietnam until 1975 
elucidates three critical factors which create the context for interpreting the Vietnamese 
during the periods of autarky and complex interdependence.   
1) Both past and contemporary Vietnamese rulers have been wary of the Church’s 
ability to establish an independent agenda, expose social cleavages, and serve as a means 
to mobilize regime dissent.   
2) The VCP’s suspicion and mistrust of the Catholic Church was founded in the 
activity of some early French Catholic missionaries who aided and abetted French 
colonization efforts of Vietnam.  The VCP’s suspicion and mistrust heightened after 
independence in 1954 after 700,000 Catholics in the north fled to the south rather than 
live under Communism.  The VCP was also suspicious of the Catholic Church due to the 
high percentage of Catholics in the RVN’s government and military.  
3) Finally, the nature and structure of the Catholic Church placed it at odds with 
communism.  The Church was highly organized and hierarchal.  At the top of a 
centralized structure sat a foreign leader, the Pope, who was openly anti-communist 
before the Vatican II Council.   
These factors have coalesced to make the VCP highly suspicious of the Catholic 
Church.  The next section provides an overview of the VCP’s view of religion and 
religious institutions at the time of reunification in 1975.  
 
B. RELIGION, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNINITY 
On 30 April 1975, the southern Republic of Vietnam officially capitulated to the 
northern communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam.  This marked the culmination 
of thirty years of war—first to achieve independence in 1954 and then to achieve 
reunification in 1975.  The VCP’s process of reunification and integration of the southern 
Vietnamese economy and society into the socialist system of the north would face many 
obstacles and much opposition.  Religion was one such potential obstacle anticipated by 
the VCP.   
There are three levels of fundamental conflict between the VCP and religious 
groups.  The first level of conflict is in the inherently anathematic natures of communism 
and religion: Communism is an atheistic ideology; religion by its very nature goes against 
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the tenets of Communism.61  Marx described religion as an “intoxicant which makes 
[people] slaves of capital” and makes people “lose all their human dignity.”62  According 
to Marxist ideology, religion was simply a tool used to exploit the working classes.  To 
an adherent of religion, however, religion represented a profound personal faith, a guide 
to a better earthly life, and a hope for the life to come.  To embrace an ideology which 
discounts and attempts to invalidate one’s personal faith, belief system, and source of 
hope, would be inherently problematic.   
The second level of conflict lies between the mono-organizational structure of the 
VCP and the relative organizational autonomy of religious groups.  As mentioned in 
chapter one, the VCP in Vietnam follows a mono-organizational structure.  The 1980 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam Constitution made the VCP the “sole force leading the 
state and society.”63  The dominating role of the VCP in Vietnamese life was described in 
party training manuals as including “all aspects of life in all domains—political, military, 
economic, social, cultural, and the material and spiritual life of the people.”64  Through 
the party, the government sought to control all aspects of society in its effort to build a 
classless society and ultimately a workers utopia.  To do this, the VCP could not have any 
competing organizations.  Other organizations posed a direct threat to the VCP’s mono-
organizational structure: religions have an established structure of authority, a nationwide 
network reaching the grass roots level, loyal congregations and adherents, and the 
resources and ability to mobilize society.65
The last fundamental level of conflict between the VCP and religious groups is an 
extension of the second conflict: the VCP views itself as the sole representative of 
liberation, nationalism, and sovereignty.   To ensure its dominance, the VCP controlled 
every aspect of Vietnamese society by bringing all organizations into the Party structure 
and co-opting their agendas.  The Party strove to control or co-opt all aspects of 
Vietnamese society such that every person and organization worked towards centralized 
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goals under Party leadership and guidance.66  The Third Party Congress in September 
1960 summed up the Party’s position on this.  Its report  stated, “Marxism-Leninism must 
absolutely dominate the moral life of the country, become the ideology of all the people, 
be the basis of which to build a new morality.”67  The Party saw religious groups as a 
likely challenge to its agenda and a potential threat to Party domination.  In particular, 
religious groups threatened the Party’s dominant ideology by diverting loyalties of 
adherents to an authority beyond the state: to an amorphous deity, an independent 
ideology or dogma, or a foreign religious leader such as the Pope.  
Thus the conflicts between religion and the VCP extended beyond a fight between 
atheism and belief; it was also a conflict over legitimacy.  If religious groups were 
successful in providing for the spiritual and social needs of their members then the VCP 
would lose legitimacy.  Thus the Party rigidly controlled and co-opted religion.  
However, before the specific policies and practices used by the state to control and co-opt 
the Catholic Church from 1975 to present and their effectiveness against the Catholic 
Church can be discussed, it is necessary first to provide a background and context for 
Vietnam’s position vis-à-vis the international community.  The next two sections 
examine how Vietnam moved from a position of relative autarky (1975 – 1986) to one of 
global integration (1987 to 2004). 
 
C. FROM AUTARKY TO DOI MOI: 1975 TO 1986 
In this section Vietnam’s state of autarky is developed by examining Vietnam’s 
diplomatic and foreign relations, its economy, and its societal integration.  Study of these 
three areas clearly shows that Vietnam was in a state of autarchy from 1975 through the 
end of 1986.  
1. Diplomatic and Foreign Relations  
The capitulation of the RVN government in the south to the North Vietnamese 
forces on 30 April 1975 marked the culmination of the Communists’ 30-year effort to 
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liberate and unify their nation.  Official reunification came on July 2, 1976 with the 
creation of the VCP-led Socialist Republic of Vietnam.68   
International factors from 1975 to 1986 exacerbated already difficult economic 
and social conditions in Vietnam.  In December 1978 after Cambodian incursions into 
Vietnamese territory, Vietnam attacked Cambodia to protect its territorial integrity.69  
Vietnam's subsequent 13-year occupation of Cambodia placed enormous strains on 
Vietnam's struggling economy and its foreign relations.  In response to Vietnam’s attack 
and occupation of Cambodia, the United States led an international economic embargo 
against Vietnam.  Vietnam's invasion into Cambodia led to a complete breakdown of 
Sino-Vietnamese relations and a short but costly month-long Chinese punitive invasion 
into Vietnam in February 1979.  To man the extended military campaign in Cambodia 
and fend off the Chinese invasion, Vietnam diverted huge investment resources to 
finance a major military buildup in 1978.  Vietnam’s armed forces grew from 770,000 to 
1.5 million.70  David Marr argues that this diversion of financial resources during the 
military buildup was so large that the second five-year plan had essentially become 
irreverent and by 1979 it was quietly set aside.71      
Another serious consequence of the breakdown of relations with China was the 
loss of approximately U.S. $600 million in Chinese aid for Vietnam’s Second Five-Year 
plan.72  By the end of the 1970s, Vietnam’s only international allies were the Soviet 
Union and the other COMECON member states.  As for regional or international 
economic or diplomatic relations, Vietnam was isolated by its actions in Cambodia and it 
residence in the Soviet Union’s camp in the bi-polar Cold War.   
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2. Economy 
The decade following reunification in 1975 was a disaster for Vietnam.  The 
Second Five-Year plan (1976-1980) was an ambitious plan to leap forward in agriculture 
and light industry, and to complete the socialist transformation of the South.73  To 
achieve a lead forward in agricultural production, the VCP instituted a wide-spread 
agriculture collectivization plan in the south.  The radical agriculture collectivization plan 
and rush to impose the North’s socialist planned economy on the south after reunification 
failed dismally.  Agricultural production plummeted as peasants lost incentive to work 
and harvest.  By 1980, 10,000 of the 13,246 established agricultural collectives had 
collapsed.74  The output in state controlled industries actually decreased by 6.5 percent 
during this period.75  The state only produced 14.4M tons of food, over 6M tons short of 
its 21M ton goal.76  The mismanagement of agriculture resources led to food shortages 
and wide-spread hunger.  
Vietnam also suffered economically and monetarily during this period.  Between 
1976 and 1980, the purchasing power of state employees declined by 48 percent.77  
During this same period national income grew at an average annual rate of only 0.4 
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The Vietnamese of 1980 are more destitute than the Vietnamese of 1976.  
Poverty is profound and harrowing.  People live above the bearable 
physiological threshold, but only just.  Many wage-earners are compelled 
to be cunning in order to survive.  Shortages lead to the persistence of 
illicit trading and corruption.79
The Third-Five Year Plan (1981-1985), despite the best of intentions, only caused 
Vietnam’s economic situation to worsen.  The plan called for more technological 
development, centralized planning, and incredulously, a completion of the failed socialist 
“transformation of agriculture” in the south.80  Mismanagement during this period led 
many state-run industries to operate at a loss.  This combined with severe shortages of 
basic necessities and huge national budget deficits led to hyperinflation.  During the 
1981-1985 period the average rise in national income was only 6.4 percent annually 
compared to a staggering 83.7 percent average annual increase in the money supply 
volume.81  Vietnam weakly attempted to address the inflation problem by implementing 
an across-the-board currency change in 1985.  This did nothing to stop the inflation and 
only exacerbated the already desperate economic situation of the  
Vietnamese populace.  By 1987, the annual inflation rate in Vietnam was estimated to be 
between 700 and 1000 percent.82    
 
3. Society and Social Integration  
Discussing post-1975 Vietnam, Gabriel Kolko stated, "The fundamental dilemma 
facing all revolutionaries is that their talent to seize power is quite unrelated to the skills 
essential for administering and holding it."83  Kolko argued that the VCP were able to 
win the war but they could not win the peace.84  Former National Liberation Front 
Minister of Justice, Truong Nhu Tang, summed up much of the frustration held by the 
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southerners over the failures of societal and social integration during the period after 
reunification.  He stated, “Instead of national reconciliation and independence, Ho Chi 
Minh's successors have given us a country devouring its own and beholden once again to 
foreigners [Soviet advisors]."85  Truong spoke of a widespread problem felt by many in 
the South: treatment as second-class citizens by northerners.  Rather than incorporate the 
former south with open arms, the northern VCP treated the southerners as a conquered 
people.  The poor treatment of the Southerners did anything but endear their new 
communist-led government to them.  Feelings of frustration and despair with the VCP’s 
monopolizing societal leadership were exacerbated by the hunger and poverty caused by 
collectivization and VCP-led centralized economic planning.     
By 1986 Vietnam was stuck in a domestic socio-economic crisis and foreign 
policy crag mire.  The VCP’s foreign policy debacles, failed economic policies, and 
dismal social integration pushed communism as an ideology to the brink of bankruptcy.86  
The VCP could no longer rely on “we won the war” for legitimacy.  The Party realized 
poverty and hunger would cause people to question the leading position of the Party in 
Vietnam.  To survive politically, the VCP hierarchy recognized the need to reform.  The 
party realized it had to find new means of legitimacy, this time based on satisfying the 
material needs of its people.  Consequently, the commanding echelons of the party 
reached agreement to ease its ideology in favor of more pragmatic policies of economic 
development and (perceived) national interests. They changed from a foreign and 
domestic policy dominated by ideology to one based on national interest and focused on 
economic growth.87   
  
 D. FROM DOI MOI TO COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE: 1987 TO 
PRESENT 
During the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986, the VCP approved the policy 
of Doi Moi (Renovation).  Doi Moi strove to move Vietnam toward economic openness 
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and administrative decentralization.  By 1987, centralized planning was abandoned and 
the private sector was formally recognized.  As a result of these changes, Vietnam 
attracted and secured foreign investment from Association of Southeast Asian Nation 
(ASEAN) countries, Europe, and the United States.  Vietnam’s change in economic 
outlook and engagement of international capital and trade led to a shift in Vietnam’s 
position vis-à-vis the international community: shifting from a position of autarchy to a 
position of complex interdependence.  This shift was evident in Vietnam in three areas: 
foreign relations, the economy, and societal integration.   
1. Diplomatic and Foreign Relations 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, Vietnam's ally and ideological mentor, the USSR, 
began pressuring Vietnam to reform and follow the Soviet Union’s example in 
implementing glasnost and perestroika.  The Soviet Union’s Secretary-General Mikhail 
Gorbachev's new thinking in international relations had a profound impact on the VCP's 
hierarchy.88  Gorbachev pressured Vietnam to end its military involvement in Cambodia 
and normalize relations with China.  He also encouraged Vietnam to adapt and work with 
the new world, not against it.  
This external pressure from the USSR combined with Vietnam's need to court 
foreign investment led to a strategic readjustment of Vietnam's national security policy.89  
The VCP decided to withdraw troops from Cambodia in 1987.90  Vietnam changed its 
security doctrine from an offensive forward-deployed military to an inward-looking 
defensive military.91  
This policy shift allowed Vietnam to initiate rapprochement with ASEAN 
member states.  In 1988 Vietnam's Secretary-General Nguyen Van Linh first articulated 
that Vietnam was "eager to join ASEAN."92  Carlyle Thayer has argued that Vietnam 
would gain three major benefits by joining ASEAN: 1) amicable relations with regional 
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states, 2) foreign investment, and 3) a catalyst in domestic economic reform.  A 
transformation in Vietnam's political relations would lead to a transformation in 
Vietnam's economic relations, which in turn would help the domestic policy of Doi 
Moi.93
The Seventh Party Congress in 1991 officially enunciated Vietnam’s new 
orientation in foreign policy.  The party congress report stated: "Vietnam wishes to be a 
friend of all countries in the world community striving for peace, independence, and 
development."94  In 1989 Vietnam had diplomatic relation with only 23 nations; by 1996, 
it had established diplomatic relations with 163 nations.95  This dramatic increase in 
diplomatic relations in such a short period of time is strong indicator of Vietnam’s 
increasing openness to the international system.   
In 1995, Vietnam became a member of ASEAN.  Since then, Vietnam has been 
an active ASEAN member, working to promote economic prosperity, peace, and 
consensus building among Southeast Asian nations.  In the early 1990s, Vietnam began 
an earnest rapprochement with its former enemy, the United States.  This  was critical to 
Vietnam’s continued economic development.  In 1993 the United States gave its support 
for international financial organizations to resume assistance to Vietnam.  In July of the 
same year, President Clinton paved the way for the resumption of international lending 
from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to Vietnam.  The U.S. trade 
embargo against Vietnam ended in February 1994. Official diplomatic relations were 
reestablished with the United States in July 1995.   
In December 2001, a Bilateral Trade Agreement between the United States and 
Vietnam was ratified.  Trade between Vietnam and the United States has grown rapidly 
since then.  Vietnam’s exports to the United States have jumped 90 percent from 2002 to 
2003.  At the end of 2003, exports to the United States were $4.6 billion.96  Meanwhile, 
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the U.S. became Vietnam’s largest export market, accounting for an estimated 70 percent 
of all Vietnamese exports.97  In 2001, Vietnam and the United States signed a Bilateral 
Trade Agreement (BTA).  In order to establish the BTA, Vietnam had to follow specific 
regulations and rules for banking, customs fees, publication of laws and regulations, and 
tariffs on certain goods and services.  
The establishment of a foreign policy of friendship and engagement, especially 
concerning the United States, is evidence of Vietnam’s commitment to market reforms 
and ascendance of national interests over antiquated Marxist-Leninist ideology.  
2. Economy 
The effects of Doi Moi upon Vietnam are clear.  Doi Moi has fostered a 
bourgeoning market economy and has moved Vietnam into the global order.  First of all, 
Doi Moi began by reducing the role of central economic planning.  The government cut 
back on state subsidies, allowing for market forces to take hold.  The government also 
introduced what Carlyle Thayer call, “socialist legality” or a nascent form of the rule of 
law.98  This played out as the government began codifying trade and finance laws. These 
new trade and finance laws helped facilitate international trade and commerce.   
 In 1990, four years after Doi Moi was implemented, Vietnam’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was U.S. $114.  During the 1990s Vietnam’s 
economy grew at an average rate of 7.5 percent.  At the end of the decade in the year 
2000, Vietnam’s GDP per capita had risen to U.S. $397.99   Today Vietnam has the 
second fastest growing economy in Asia after China.100   
The growth in Vietnam’s economy has been fuelled by Vietnam’s integration into 
the global market and community.  Most importantly, this growth has come through 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and increased international trade.  Economic relations 
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with the United States provided a big “carrot” to leverage further reform and 
liberalization in Vietnam.  Securing a BTA with the United States was just a taste of the 
benefits membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) would bring to Vietnam.  
Joining the WTO is presently Vietnam’s top economic goal.  Vietnam’s Trade Vice-
Minister Luong Van Tu has emphatically stated that Vietnam wants to join the WTO “as 
soon as possible.”101  Membership in the WTO will give Vietnam significantly increased 
access to the markets of the WTO’s 147 members.  Vietnamese leaders deem this access 
key to Vietnam’s continued economic development and, indirectly, to Party legitimacy.   
Vietnam first applied for WTO membership in 1995 but did not begin 
negotiations until 2002.  To join the WTO Vietnam has been required to liberalize its 
market access and meet international standards on investment, trade, and financial 
transparency.  This process has been slow and has met resistance from Party hardliners 
hesitant to veer so far from ideology.  Nevertheless, Party reformers have continued to 
push Vietnam’s bid for membership forward.  Most likely, Vietnam’s entry will be 
delayed until the end of 2005 due to its slow legal and market reforms.  The potential of 
the textile and garment industry is a key factor motivating Vietnam to work out the final 
reforms required to accede to the WTO by the end of 2005.  This industry is Vietnam’s 
second largest export sector, but is currently subject to quotas.  However, the textile and 
garments quota system for WTO members will end in 2005.102   
Vietnam’s strong desire to expedite reforms in order to ensure WTO membership 
by the end of 2005 gives international proponents of reform and liberalization much 
leverage.  As seen through the textile and garment industry example, Vietnam’s economy 
is becoming more and more tied to the interworkings of foreign forces.  Vietnam’s 
economic and political integration has brought Vietnam out of autarchy and into a state 
moving towards complex interdependence with the international community.  Aside from 
giving external forces leverage to encourage reform in Vietnam, Vietnam’s integration 
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into globalization has also allowed internal forces to place pressure on the Party to reform 
and liberalize.   
3. Society and Social Integration 
Vietnam’s economic liberalization under the Doi Moi reforms suffered a brief 
period of retrenchment in reaction to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and in the 
Soviet Union, and later to the Asian economic crisis in 1997.103   The VCP attributed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union to the communist leadership losing control of the system 
through recklessly undertaking economic reforms without assuring the political stability 
of communism.104  The VCP viewed national security as analogues to maintaining the 
Party’s absolute power in order to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of 
Vietnam.105  The Soviet Union veered from this and consequently imploded into chaos.  
The VCP did not want economic liberalization to lead to an implosion in Vietnam as it 
had in the Soviet Union.    
By the end of 1991, the VCP viewed the threat of “peaceful evolution” as one of 
Vietnam’s largest threats.106  Peaceful evolution was the notion held by many senior 
VCP leaders that unwelcome democratic reforms and influences would attend the new 
economic policies, expanded foreign relations, and international integration.  Party 
hardliners saw reforms and international integration as a means to exacerbate political 
instability in Vietnam, leading to the erosion of one-party rule.107  In spite of these fears 
of peaceful evolution, the VCP felt it must press ahead with increased VCP-led reform to 
achieve economic growth through increased foreign direct investment. To maintain 
legitimacy, the VCP must lead continue to lead the country in the direction of economic 
prosperity.  
The tremendous growth in technological advancements during the past 15 to 20 
years has had a great effect both directly and indirectly on the development of internal 
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forces within Vietnam capable of leveraging pressure against the Party to reform and 
liberalize.  David Marr points out that access to global media in Vietnam is diminishing 
the state’s capacity to control information.  Marr argues that the   Vietnamese are finding 
ways to pursue their own agendas and circumvent the state-owned media through 
previously unprecedented access to overseas sources.108   
One of the largest sources of foreign information, and the most difficult to 
control, is the internet.  The internet first became publicly available in Vietnam in 1998.  
At that time there were just 3,000 subscribers.109  Since then, the number of internet 
subscribers and users has grown exponentially.  By June 2003, there were an estimated 
465,000 internet subscribers in Vietnam and 1.9 million internet users.110  In the year 
2000, there were 60,000 Vietnamese web sites linked to the five state-owned Internet 
Service Providers and in the year 2001, there were 205,000 sites.111  The availability and 
use of the internet is clearly taking off. 
The internet potentially provides unlimited access to all sorts of information.  The 
government has created firewalls in an attempt to block all anti-party sites and is 
attempting to catch all activity on the internet which it deems undermines the Party. 
But for the VCP, the imposition of foreign and potentially anti-party ideas is not 
the real threat; the real threat comes in the internet’s innate ability to network people 
together allowing them to become part of transnational organizations and causes.  The 
internet in Vietnam is creating new transnational domains.112   
The technological revolution in information and communications, particularly as 
manifested in the internet, has gone hand and hand with globalization in diffusing “power 
away from governments and empowering individuals.113  The effects of globalization 
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have allowed technology to spread, empowering less powerful actors in the international 
ring.114  One manifestation of these previously less powerful actors in transnational 
actors.  Today transnational actors are found in numerous foreign non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in Vietnam.  By the end of 2004 there were approximately 500 
foreign NGOs registered and operating in Vietnam.115  These transnational actors are 
then networked throughout the world via technology creating transnational networks.  
These networks affect economic, technological, health, educational, social, and religious 
issues.  Through the development of technology and globalization, “actors other than 
states participate in world politics.”116  As Vietnam becomes more intertwined in the 
world, transnational networks have greater leverage and effectiveness in influencing state 
policy.117   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has established the historical, political, and geopolitical context 
against to examine how Vietnam’s degree of integration in the international community 
affects its view and treatment of the Catholic Church.  The early history of the Catholic 
Church in Vietnam until 1975 give historical reasons for the VCP’s mistrust and 
suspicion of the Catholic Church and religion in general.  The Church’s ability to 
establish an independent agenda and mobilize society, along with its ideological 
differences with communism, coalesced to make the VCP want to ensure it controls and 
co-opts the Church and by so doing minimizes the potential threat.  In a broader context, 
there are fundamental conflicts between religious groups and the VCP at three levels:     
1) ideology; 2) structure; and 3) social perception.  Finally, the chapter examined   
                                                 
114 Ibid, 98.  See also Michael Haas, “Internal Security, Democratization, and Globalization in 
Southeast Asia,” in The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition, [on-line]; Available from 
http://www.apcss.org/ Publications/SAS/SASAPResponse030320/Regionalfinal.htm; Internet; Accessed 15 
September 2004.    
115 Committee for NGO affairs, VUFO and PACCOM, viewed at 
http://www.ngocentre.netnam.vn/ngores_E/intro001.htm 
116 Keohane and Nye, 24. 
117 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics: Introduction’, in Essential Readings in World Politics, eds. Karen Mingst and Jack Snyder (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), 336 – 338.   
 32
Vietnam’s diplomatic and foreign relations, economics, and society during Vietnam’s 
period of autarchy and the extent of its global integration.   
The VCP has obvious historical reasons to distrust and suspect the Catholic 
Church.  Furthermore, the VCP has inherent conflicts with religion which would 
intuitively lead the VCP to seek to control and co-opt religion to prevent a religious 
group from weakening the VCP’s position or becoming too a strong competitor to the 
Party’s lead role of building and guiding the nation and society.  During Vietnam’s 
period of autarky, 1975 to 1986, the VCP suppressed, controlled, and co-opted the 
Catholic Church.  Due to Vietnam’s isolation, the VCP had no reason to grant 
concessions to the Church.  By 1986 the VCP clearly saw its socialist policies failing and 
itself losing legitimacy.  To counter this negative trend the Party launched the Doi Moi 
reforms.  Doi Moi led to Vietnam’s emergence from autarky to embrace the global 
community as it strove to develop economically and embrace the international 
community.  As Vietnam embraced globalization it was exposed to new forces, interests, 
and technologies.  This exposure has pressured the VCP to allow greater religious 
freedom.  The next two chapters show how the Catholic Church in Vietnam has enjoyed 
greater religious freedom in the conditions of complex interdependence than under the 
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III. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN VIETNAM, 1975 – 1987 
The Catholic Church in Vietnam has gone through many seasons: organization, 
persecution, and expansion.  I propose that the Catholic Church in Vietnam entered a new 
season after the reunification of Vietnam by Communist forces on 30 April 1975.118  
Reunification and the ascendancy of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) brought 
upon the Catholic Church a period of suppression and cooptation.  This period first began 
in the North in 1954 with the establishment of the communist-led Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam.  Now controlling a unified government over all Vietnam, the VCP brought 
this new season of suppression and cooptation upon all Vietnamese Catholics: in the 
North and the South.   
The Catholic Church in the South at reunification was a different church than in 
the North.  A massive exodus of some 700,000 Catholics, twenty plus years of 
suppression and cooptation, and isolation from the Vatican left the Church in the North 
weak, politically submissive, and out of touch with mainstream Catholicism.  In 1975 
there were fewer than one million Catholics in the North and just fewer than 400 priests.  
In the South, there were nearly two million Catholics and 3,000 priests.119  The Church in 
the South was numerically double the size of the North and while the Church in the North 
had one priest for ever 2,475 parishioners, the Church in the South had one priests for 
every 633 parishioners.  The Catholic Church in the South had implemented liberalizing 
changes after the Vatican II Council.120  These changes, such as reading mass in 
Vietnamese and liberalizing Catholic attitudes towards local customs such as bowing to 
the alters of ancestors, made the Catholic church in the South more adapted and suitable 
for Vietnamese society.121  Compared to the Catholic Church in the North at 
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reunification the Catholic Church in the South was more integrated into Vietnamese 
society and culture, and more politically active.  
When the VCP began to integrate the South under the socialist model and rebuild 
the reunified country, the Catholic Church, in the South in particular, posed a potential 
threat and challenge to the legitimacy of the newly reunified Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam.  The Church was too large to be eradicated, yet too strong a social force to 
leave unchecked.  According to socialist theory, religion should die out once a socialist 
society has been fully constructed.122  Accordingly, if the VCP suppressed the Church’s 
ability to challenge the VCP politically or socially, the Church should eventually die off 
of natural causes once the VCP had established a fully developed socialist society.  
Furthermore, the VCP could use religious groups to further the Party’s own political and 
social ends by co-opting them to promote the government’s socialist agenda.  Thus, after 
the reunification of Vietnam, the VCP implemented a sustained policy of suppression and 
cooptation of religious groups.   
Against this context, this chapter examines four aspects of the Catholic Church in 
Vietnam from 1975-1986.  First it illustrates the initial impact of reunification on the 
Catholic Church.  Next, the chapter elucidates how the state codified religious control 
and constitutional religious “freedom” to suppress and begin co-opting religion.  The 
third section discusses the Catholic Church’s efforts to survive during this period.  
Finally, the chapter will take an in-depth look at how the state was able to successfully 
co-opt the Church during this period. 
 
A. INITIAL IMPACT OF REUNIFICATION ON THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
Upon reunification of Vietnam the government’s position towards religion and 
religious institutions was to eliminate them as social and spiritual guiding forces in the 
lives of Southern Vietnamese.  According to the VCP, the Catholic Church’s hierarchy 
had become “a force opposed to all movements for national liberation and social 
progress” and a “state within a state.”123  The new government, the Socialist Republic of 
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Vietnam (SRV), sought to eliminate the Church as an autonomous force in the southern 
society and contain its future growth and influence.   
Catholics were both fearful and anxious about what their fate would be under the 
new communist regime.  An estimated 56,000 Catholics, including 400 priests and lay 
leaders, fled Vietnam shortly before the Communist took over the South in 1975.124  The 
majority of the 1.9 million Catholics living in the South in 1975 had no choice but to stay 
and make the best of living under the new regime.  The new Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam was keenly aware of the high percentage of Southern Catholics who had been 
active in the South’s government and military.  For example, in 1960, 66 percent of the 
Senators, 30 percent of the Members of Parliament, and 21 percent of the high ranking 
military officers were all Catholic.125  The Communist also knew that upwards of 
700,000 of the 1.9 million Catholics in the South had overtly expressed their animosity or 
unwillingness to support or live in a communist system by fleeing the North for the South 
in 1954.  The Communist believed many Southern Catholics were anti-Communist and 
must be suppressed.  It was time to draw the curtains on the Catholic Church’s role as an 
active societal actor and force in the South. For this reason, the regime employed five 
specific yet at times overlapping and interconnected policies 
1. Arrests and Re-education 
One of the first steps taken against the Catholic Church by the new regime was to 
arrest Church members and priests deemed by the VCP to be a threat to the new regime.  
These individuals were arrested on spurious charges and sent to reeducation camps for 
indefinite periods of incarceration.  The purpose of the reeducation camp was three fold: 
1) take threats to the new regime out of society, 2) punish individuals, and 3) indoctrinate 
members of the Southern society so when released they would no longer be a threat to 
communist society or have reactionary tendencies. 
The reeducation camps largely accomplished their purposes by breaking the 
spirits of their detainees.  Approximately 70 priests who were chaplains in the Army of 
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the Republic of Vietnam were sent to reeducation camps in 1975.126  Between 1975 and 
1977, an additional two to three hundred priests and lay religious persons were arrested, 
imprisoned, or sent to reeducation camps.127  Under these circumstances priests were 
both prohibited and prevented from performing their religious duties.  The VCP asserted 
that none of the arrests or prison sentences were instigated for religious reasons.  Rather, 
the VCP maintained all were arrested and incarcerated for contravening state policy or 
for inciting civil unrest.128   
In reality, most of those arrested and sent to reeducation camps were incarcerated 
because of their opposition to communism, their position in the former Republic of 
Vietnam’s government or military, or their association with the United States during the 
war. The Communist used the charge that Catholics had “documented” their opposition 
to communism by fleeing from the North to the South in 1954.  This sole rationale was 
provided for the incarceration of many priests.129  In the case of the chaplains, the fact 
they were members of the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam was on its own 
sufficient grounds for arrests and reeducation.130  
The initial arrests of Catholic priests and other lay Catholic leaders demonstrated 
the VCP’s position of suppressing the Church and in particular suppressing any religious 
leader who posed even a potential threat to the new regime.  Priests were arrested who 
were judged to have the capacity and inclination to lead opposition against the new 
developing communist government in Vietnam.  The initial arrests took many priests out 
of the Catholic population and weakened the Catholic Church in Vietnam structurally.   
2. Contact with the Vatican  
Another immediate act by the government to weaken the Catholic Church in 
Vietnam was to cut off free contact between the Vatican and the Church in Vietnam.  The 
VCP viewed the Vatican as an “organization of exploitation on a grand scale, which has 
always been tied to anti-revolutionary and anti-communist capitalism.”131  The Vatican 
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had a long history of anti-communism.  The VCP believed it would be best for the 
Catholics in the South to not have free contact with the Vatican while the South was 
being taken over and rebuild by a communist led government.  The Vatican might foster 
and/or fuel anti-communists resentment and notions of descent.   
The government allowed minimal contact with the Vatican in the north only after 
years of isolation.  The government only let the Church resume contact with Rome when 
they felt they had firm control of the Church in the north and when it was in their 
interests.132  Priests and bishops in the South would have to go through a period or 
suppression and subservience to the Party just like the Catholics in the North did before 
the Party would let them resume contact with the Vatican.   
3. Breakup of Church Social Linkages and Organizational 
Infrastructure in the South 
The Catholic Church in the South at the time of reunification was well entrenched 
in southern society.  Through elementary and secondary school, two universities, 
orphanages, hospitals, and numerous Catholic associations for people of all ages.  The 
extent to which the Church was engrained in civil society and had the capacity to lead it 
posed a potential direct threat to the VCP’s desire to hold a monopoly on the 
development and guidance of society in the South.   
All educational and charitable work performed by the Catholic Church in the 
South stopped after the Communist take over.  Catholic-run elementary schools, high 
schools, and two universities, student hostels, orphanages and hospitals were either 
expropriated or nationalized by the communists.  The Catholics were not allowed to stay 
in charge of or run any of the schools or institutions.  The Church also had a wide 
network of associations: the Assembly of Catholic Dioceses; the Catholic Mothers’ 
Association; the Associations of the Virgin Mother’s Children; and the Thanh The Youth 
Association.  All of these associations and their activities were banned and dissolved 
from public activity.133  This was done to take away the Catholic Church’s influence in 
Vietnamese society. 
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4. Control of the Internal Affairs 
The state’s position on controlling appointments to the priesthood was manifested 
shortly after reunification.  At a meeting for Catholic clergy in August 1975 organized by 
the new regime, a Party official affirmed the Party’s position.  The official stated:  
To place a bishop in the position of heading a diocese is not a matter 
related only to religion.  To say that it is a matter of religion, means to 
separate Catholicism from the Nation.  Each Vietnamese Christian family 
is a unit of the Vietnamese Society.  Therefore, the appointment of a 
person to head a diocese must be approved by the revolutionary 
administration.134
The state sought to control the priesthood by overseeing ordination and 
appointments.  According to VCP logic, overseeing who becomes the leader of an 
organization in society, in this case the Catholic Church, is clearly within the roles and 
scope of Party responsibility.  After all, it is the VCP who has the primary responsibility 
to lead and guide Vietnamese society.   
Another indirect way the VCP immediately began to control the Catholic 
priesthood was by closing all seminaries.  In 1975 there were six major seminaries 
operating in South and none in the North. There were over 1000 seminarians studying to 
enter the priesthood.135  After 1975, all six seminaries closed.  The facilities of two of the 
oldest seminaries, Pontifical Institute of Dalat and the Vinh Long Seminary, were seized 
and expropriated for government use.136  By 1986 there was only one seminary operating 
in all of Vietnam.  It was in Hanoi and only had 16 seminaries enrolled.  In 1987, the first 
seminary in the former South reopened.  It had only 45 students.137  
There are indications that the state, if not at the national level, certainly at the 
provincial level and below, followed a subtle plan intended to prevent Catholics from 
attending church and to distance them from the Church.  More so in the country than in 
the cities, daily masses were prohibited on the notion that it hindered work 
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productivity.138  Another subtle way of suppressing the ability to attend church was 
through the use of conflicting mandatory public events.  Catholics often found 
themselves unable to attend special religious events and services because the local 
people’s committee would organize a public meeting or some other  event which required 
mandatory attendance.139  These tactics were used to supplant the Church as the 
dominating social force in the lives of Vietnamese Catholics.  The VCP wanted to 
establish a clear break between a Catholic’s faith and his or her life.  That is, faith and 
religion should be confined to the liturgy within church walls.   All aspects of society 
belonged to the VCP.140  The VCP wanted to isolate the Church from society. 
5. Crafting the Party’s View of Catholicism 
To strengthen the VCP’s position as the rightful and legitimate leading force in 
Vietnam, the VCP actively disparaged the Catholic Church and negatively recast its 
history in popular literature, public school history texts, and other forms of popular 
media. 
The VCP regarded Catholics as friends of the “reactionary forces of 
capitalism.”141  Numerous anti-religious texts were published after 1975 with this theme.  
Religion, the Catholic Church in particular, was portrayed as a force of “pretense, 
deception, and hypocrisy.” 142  Catholic priests and lay persons were portrayed as 
unpatriotic collusionists who in reality feigned their religious convictions.  
Another reason for rewriting Vietnamese history was to justify the economic 
success and relatively greater prosperity enjoyed by the much more developed South than 
under the communist led North.  Numerous books and articles published between 1975 
and 1981 portrayed the role of the Catholic Church in the former South as being a liaison 
between Catholics and foreign and anti-revolutionary forces.  Special emphasis was 
placed on missionaries as preparing Vietnam for French colonization.143  These writings 
and histories do not mention Catholicism in the context of faith.  They only view the 
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Catholic Church in political terms: its opposition towards the revolution and support of 
colonial and capitalist forces. 
Anti-Catholicism was portrayed in both film and theater.  A film entitled Holy 
Day depicted a Catholic priest who raped girls during confessionals.  In a play performed 
by the Central Classical Drama Group, the plot again revolves around a priest who rapes 
parishioners.  However, in this play, the priest is also an agent of the CIA and secretly 
goes around blowing up local public buildings.144  The intent of such anti-Catholic media 
was to tarnish the reputation of the Church and boost the position of the VCP.145
The initial acts of suppression against the Catholic Church after reunification 
were designed to take away the Catholic Church’s ability to guide and influence society.  
Catholic leaders, ordained and lay, were arrested and sent to reeducation camps.  This 
removed those Catholics who were most likely to actively lead opposition to the new 
regime.  In the end, the Catholic Church was allowed to continue to exist and operate; 
however, its capacity as a social agent was reduced to a minimal existence.  
 
B. CODIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS CONTROL  
The newly created Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) imposed the same rigid 
controls on religion in the South as their predecessor, the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, did in the North beginning in 1954.146  The Vietnamese Workers Party 
organized the Fatherland Front in 1955, which replaced the Viet Minh as the nation-wide 
mass front organization.  The Fatherland Front included many groups: Peasant’s 
associations, labor unions, women and youth leagues, and religious organizations.  This 
was done in the South in the 1975.  Placing religion under the Fatherland Front helped 
the state regulate and control religion in two ways.  First, it created support for the state 
and channeled citizens’ concerns and criticisms in a non-threatening manner to the 
party.147  Second, it officially restricted religious groups’ autonomy and independence 
from the government.  Under a branch of the Fatherland Front, each church was officially 
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sanctioned by a state run ruling body.  In this way, the VCP institutionalized control of 
religion. 
In the political report delivered during the Fourth Party Congress held in 
December 1976, the VCP enunciated the foundation of its policy towards religion.  
Concerning religion the report made three points.  First, the SRV “respect[s] the right to 
freedom of religion and the right to atheism.”  Second, the Party’s goal was to “educate 
and motivate the masses and religious groups to implement political tasks set forth by the 
Party.”  And third, the Party would “help free the churches from the imperialist shackles 
and return them to the people.”148  This statement showed that the Party would 
superficially allow religion to exist, however, it clearly intended to control and direct 
religious groups’ agendas.  The statement also reflected the Party’s paranoia of foreign 
intervention and subversion which it suspected of coming through religion.  The 
authoritative Party journal, Communist Review, illustrated the Party’s fear of subversion 
coming through religion as it warned about “imperialist plots to capitalize on religion” 
and “imperialist and reactionary hiding behind religion.”149
To systematize and make official the state’s control of religion the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam’s Council of Ministers passed Resolution 297 in November 1977.  
The resolution attempted to bring all religious activities under detailed government 
regulation and scrutiny.  In essence, the resolution provided the legal framework upon 
which the VCP has been able to officially suppress, control, and co-opt religion.    
Resolution 297 instituted a comprehensive set of regulations which served to 
subordinate religion to the state.  Government approval is required for practically all 
forms of religions activity.  The resolution required religions to obtain government 
permission to hold any type of religious class, hold a training seminar, convention, or 
hold a celebration in addition to normally calendared events.  It also required government 
approval to build, remodel, or repair a church and it required government approval to 
transfer clergy from one location to another.150  Additionally, elucidating the state’s goal 
to co-opt clergy, the resolution stated that “besides preaching religious teachings, 
                                                 
148 Nguyen Van Canh, 165. 
149 Ibid, 166. 
150 Ibid,166-167. 
 43
[clergymen] have the duty to mobilize followers to perform well citizen’s obligations and 
to carry out well the policies and laws of the state.”151  
Priests had to show complete obedience and submissiveness to the party, as any 
deviation could cause him to lose his right to teach and be a priest.  The provision states 
that priests must seek permission to conduct extraordinary celebrations, conduct all 
religious instruction, and that sermons must not spread superstitions nor speak against the 
socialist regime and must move the faithful to follow the VCP’s political line.152
Local level government officials are responsible for granting permission to priests 
and ensure religious services or activities do not contravene the political line a broad 
range of arbitrary control over religions.  Thus because power is centered  at local levels, 
there is broad arbitrary power of the state to control religion effectively negated any 
claims of religious freedom mentioned in the resolution.  The resolution claimed to 
“guarantee freedom of worship while preventing all anti-revolutionary forces from 
misusing religion to erect obstacles to the construction of socialism.”153  In this respect 
the resolution makes religious freedom empty of substance. 
The Resolution prohibits the Catholic Church from enforcing any Vatican 
documents or policies that are contrary to the laws and policies of the state.154  Again, 
this gives the state the legal ability to preempt Vatican control of the Catholic Church in 
Vietnam.  The state can reject any Vatican policy or decree by claiming it contravenes 
Vietnamese state law or policy.   
As for obtaining religious books from the Vatican or other places, the resolution 
completely negates this by permitting religions to use only books published by the state-
run printing press.  
Lastly, Resolution 297 led to a severe shortage of priests—a shortage which 
negatively affects the Church but furthers the VCP agenda for exerting social control 
over Catholics.  Resolution 297 states, “all religions may set up schools for the training of 
specialists in religious activities. The persons selected for training must enjoy civil rights, 
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prove their patriotism and love for socialism.”155  As previously mentioned, all 
seminaries were closed and the first one was not reopened until 1983.  It is difficult to 
open seminaries as the state claims the right to control the curriculum.  Long negations 
must take place before a seminary can be opened so that the state feels it controls the 
curriculum and the Church feels doctrinal integrity is maintained.  Aside from the lack of 
seminaries, the next big hurdle to increasing the number of priests is the requirements for 
selecting priesthood candidates.  Before a potential candidate can enter the seminary, the 
government checks his “patriotic” background.  It does this by examining individuals’ 
curriculum vitae.156  Consideration is also given to a potential priest’s family and friends’ 
curriculum vitae.157  If an individual is found to have a sufficiently patriotic background, 
then he is allowed to enter the seminary.  Upon the completion of seminary, an individual 
must be reevaluated by the VCP before he is allowed to be ordained a priest.  A candidate 
for the priesthood also must be from the region in which he will later work.158  This 
potentially prevents good candidates entering the seminary if their area already has met 
its quota.  The government’s meticulous screening process has made it very difficult for 
the Catholic Church to recruit, train, and ordain enough quality priests.   
The basic effect of these policies is the clergy has less and less time to spend with 
Church members.  Because of attrition the number of priests decreases and due to 
population growth, the population of the Church increases.  Consequently, the state and 
the VCP are able to take a greater role and position of prominence in the lives of Church 
members.  The dominant position in society once held by the Church becomes 
marginalized.  The demographics of the Bui Chu diocese in the North in 1975 is a good 
example of the VCP’s plan to create a disproportion between the number of priests and 
members.  In the Bui Chu diocese there were 31 priests for 143 parishes, or 4.6 parishes 
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and 11,290 Catholics per priest.159  One priest cannot adequately serve 11,290 church 
members.  The VCP intended to recreate this phenomenon in the South after 1975. 
In the end, Resolution 297 gave the government control of the publication and 
distribution of all church material, the training, education, ordination, appointment, 
promotion, and transfer of clergy.  The state also controlled all church property and 
maintained control of all religious schools and monasteries by controlling who teaches, 
who enters the school, the curriculum, and by making the state the only legal source of 
funding for the schools.160  
In December 1980, the National Assembly ratified the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam’s first constitution.  Article 68 dealt specifically with religion.  The article 
concisely summarizes the VCP’s view and policy towards religion.  It states, “All citizens 
enjoy the freedom of worship, and may practice or not practice a religion.”  The next 
clause in the article provides the state with broad legal justification to dominate, control, 
and even co-opt religion.  It states, “no one may misuse religions to violate state laws or 
policies.”161  Finally, Article 4 of the 1980 Constitution solidifies the VCP as the only 
force to lead Vietnam.  The article authoritatively states, “The Vietnam Communist 
Party, the vanguard and general staff of the Vietnamese working class, armed with 
Marxism-Leninism, is the only force leading the state and society and the main factor 
determining all success of the Vietnamese revolution.”162  Thus from the 1980 
constitution, if a religion is judged to propagate a doctrine or agenda not in harmony with 
the VCP, that religion can be found guilty of violating state law or policy.  Any religion 
or religious official who strays from the Party’s control could face harsh punitive 
repression for the institution and arrest and imprisonment for the official.  
Resolution 297 and Article 68 of the 1980 Constitution make it clear that religious 
freedom depends on a church’s compatibility with the VCP’s socialist agenda and view 
of patriotism. 
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 C. KEEPING THE FAITH AMIDST SUPPRESSION  
Shortly after the capitulation of the South to the North, the two archbishops of 
South Vietnam, Nguyen Van Binh and Nguyen Kim Diem, signed a joint statement 
which rejoiced over the peace brought by reunification.  The statement called on 
Catholics to “march without fear” and help build the new society and to patriotically 
embrace government efforts to rebuild their war ravaged country.163  This statement was 
arguably intended to assuage Communist concerns over the traditional anti-Communist 
Catholic view as much as it was to rally Catholic support for the new communist regime.  
The statement also demonstrated the clergy’s resolve for the Church to march forward in 
the faith—come what may with the new regime. 
The regulations imposed upon the Church from Resolution 287 made 
administering to the spiritual needs of parishioners very difficult for the depleted Catholic 
clergy.  Consequently, many activities were forced underground.  Underground church 
activities from 1975 to 1986 focused solely on spiritual issues and avoided political 
matters.  Underground activities included the following: circulating religious 
publications, organizing bible study groups, unofficial church associations, teaching 
catechism to children, unauthorized masses, and ordaining priests without government 
consent.164  The clergy was forced to take such measures due to the previously discussed 
suppression and limitations imposed upon the Catholic clergy.   
In April 1980 all bishops in Vietnam gathered in Hanoi for an Episcopal 
conference.165  The Catholic Church in the North and in the South was separated in 1954 
when Vietnam was divided.  Due to forced political separation, the two Church’s 
developed separated organizational hierarchies.  For all intents and purposes, the Church 
in Vietnam continued to operate as two churches, one in the north and one in the south, 
after national reunification in 1975.  This conference was the first time since 1952 that all 
Vietnamese bishops were able to hold a general assembly.  During the conference the 
bishops formed the Unified Bishops’ Council of Vietnam.  They elected a permanent 
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council headed by Cardinal Trinh Van Can of Hanoi.  The newly created Bishop’s 
Council became the governing body of the Catholic Church in all of Vietnam. 166  Aside 
from marking the official reunification of the Northern and Southern Catholic Churches, 
the conference issued a letter to all Vietnamese setting forth an official position of the 
Catholic Church towards the new regime.  The Conference urged Catholics to “contribute 
to national reconstruction and defense.”167
After issuing this statement and convening the conference, bishops met with 
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong.  As a result of the statement and positive meeting with 
the Prime Minster, the government in principle allowed  Vietnamese bishops to make the 
five-yearly ad limina visit to the Vatican with the Pope.  The number of bishops allowed 
to make the visits has varied greatly with subsequent ad limina visits.  In 1980 the 
government allowed 19 Vietnamese bishops to make the ad limina visit with the Pope.168
From 1975 to 1987 Catholic clergy in Vietnam had to go underground to take care 
of their members.  In public they had to walk a tight line to ensure they did not run afoul 
with the government and that their preaching was in harmony with the VCP party-line.  
They also had to ensure they avoided even the appearance of political activity.  All 
activity had to be isolated to spiritual issues.  When the Church dealt with secular issues, 
particularly societal or political, it was met with quick and swift suppression from the 
government. 
Nationally, the Catholic Church was able to establish a unified hierarchy, the 
Bishops Council, which was accepted by both the government of Vietnam and the 
Vatican.  Statements by the Bishops Council emphasized Catholics’ duty to rebuild the 
nation under the leadership of the VCP and exhibit true patriotism.  This helped assuage 
the government’s concerns concerning the Church as a whole and allowed the Church to 
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D. STATE COOPTATION OF THE CHURCH 
To understand the full effects of the suppression and new limitations placed upon 
religion after reunification by the communist regime, we need to examine how the state 
co-opted church to further the VCP’s political agenda and specifically what effect this 
had on the Catholic Church.  The VCP viewed religion as a camouflage for colonialist 
and capitalist—that the French and American’s had used religion to further their agendas 
in Vietnam.  Thus the VCP saw in religion an inherent threat and a potential tool.  The 
VCP would take care of this threat by turning religion into a political instrument. 
A VCP internal paper dating from 1982 clearly states the religious policy with 
regards to the Catholic Church.  The paper showed that the Party’s aim was to transform 
the Catholic Church in Vietnam from “an instrument of imperialism and anti-communism 
into a religion in the service of the state, patriotic, and close to socialism.”169  In other 
words, they intended to neutralize the Church as a potential threat to the Party’s 
monopoly of power and social control and co-opt the Church so that it furthers the 
Party’s agenda. 
Resolution 297 on religion provides for the “specialist in religious activities” to be 
duty-bound to include in his or her sermons that which encourages others to fulfill their 
civic duties.170  Thus the government’s view of religions was that they were to be used as 
a mean of propagating the party-line and guidance for rebuilding society.  Every time the 
Central Committee issued a new policy or directive, the Fatherland Front organized study 
sessions for priests and others in the mass organizations to explain the policy or directive 
and further indoctrinate them in socialism.171  The priests were then responsible to 
support and convey the new party guidance to their parishioners.  
This brand of cooptation took away from the priest’s ability to preach pure 
unadulterated doctrine.  Instead, a priest had to allow himself to be used for propaganda 
purposes.  Intelligence officers watched over parishes to ensure sermons did not veer 
from the party’s agenda.  If the priest was found to diverge from the party-line in either 
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secular or spiritual matters, he could be subject to harassment, interrogation, arrests, 
and/or indefinite imprisonment.172
In 1983 the government attempted to subvert the Bishops Council.  Under the 
auspices of the Fatherland Front, the government organized the Unifying Committee of 
Patriotic Catholics.  This committee replaced the former Liaison Committee of Patriotic 
and Peace-Loving Catholics which had led the Catholic Church in the North since 1955.  
The Unifying Committee of Patriotic Catholics, like its Northern predecessor, the Liaison 
Committee of Patriotic and Peace-Loving Catholics, became the official mass 
organization for Catholics.  The Unifying Committee of Patriotic Catholics was a part of 
the Fatherland Front which was in turn the VCP’s front organization for to control and 
direct all mass organizations.  In this way, the Catholic Church became directly organized 
under the VCP.  It became a means, like all other mass organizations incorporated in the 
Fatherland Front, for the VCP to channel its guidance to build socialism in Vietnam.  The 
group also became the official liaison between the government and the Church—thus 
marginalizing the Bishops Council.   
The government first tried to establish the Unifying Committee of Patriotic 
Catholics in the South in 1976.  However, this met much resistance from Southern 
bishops.  Finally, in 1980, Archbishop of Saigon, Paul Nguyen Van Binh, agreed to the 
establishment of a nascent liaison committee.   Finally, in 1983, the Southern Bishops 
conceded to combining their nascent liaison committee with the Liaison Committee of 
Patriotic and Peace-Loving Catholics in the North to establish the nation-wide Unifying 
Committee of Patriotic Catholics.173  
The VCP’s Fatherland Front led the initiative to establish the Unifying Committee 
of Patriotic Catholics.  The Fatherland Front also chose all the delegates.  The delegates 
sent to form the group were not blessed by their bishops or their diocese – just picked by 
the Fatherland Front.174  Church leaders did not have a say in who attended and thus 
those priests who attended did not represent the Church leaders.  Vietnamese bishops 
were greatly concerned over the new organization.  They feared the creation of an 
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autonomous church separate from the Vatican.  They did not want what happened in 
China to happen in Vietnam.175  The new committee split the allegiance of Catholics 
between the Vatican and the VCP.  Since all Vietnamese had to first follow the dictates 
of the Party and government, the new committee would become the ultimate authority for 
the Vietnamese Church in Vietnam, regardless what the Vatican or the Bishops Council 
said. 
The purpose of the new committee as outlined in article two of the Committee’s 
charter made this clear.  It stated that the committee is to “mobilize Vietnamese Catholics 
to defend the socialist regime, fight against imperialists and reactionaries who use 
religion to oppose the regime and unite with Christians around the world in support of 
peace, justice, and social progress.”176  The head of the state’s Bureau of Religious 
Affairs, Dang Thanh Chon, made the implications of the purpose of the committee even 
clearer.  He stated that the new Committee was a state organism, thus whoever opposes it 
“evidently violates the law in Vietnam.”177  This statement made following the Bishops 
Council over the Committee an illegal act which goes directly goes against the party.  
The Archbishop of Hue, Msgr. Nguyen Kim Dien, publicly opposed the new 
committee. He went as far as suspending one of the Friars from his diocese for attending 
the meeting.  Msgr. Nguyen sent a letter to the president of the committee, Father Nguyen 
The Vinh stating that the Committee had been formed without the bishops blessing and 
expressed his fear that this could result in a formation of a separate Church as is held in 
China.  Msgr. Nguyen said the group should refer the matter to the Episcopal Conference 
(Bishops Council) who alone held the authority to direct the activities of the Church in 
Vietnam.  The letter was forwarded to the Fatherland Front.  Msgr. Nguyen was 
summoned for 50 days of interrogations.  After being released from interrogation, he was 
subject to tight surveillance from security authorities and was not permitted to leave the 
city of Hue.  The government’s response to Archbishop Nguyen’s position and attitude 
towards the committee clearly shows the state did not view this as an internal matter of 
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the Church but a matter of the state and that Archbishop Nguyen had gone against the 
party’s agenda.178  
The Unifying Committee of Patriotic Catholics became the state’s official 
representation of the Catholic Church in Vietnam.  This committee combined with the 
regulations placed upon the Church in Resolution 297 allowed VCP to co-opt the Church.  
In particular the VCP was able to screen all priests, sermons, church meetings, 
publications, development of junior priests, and use the Church as a means of state and 
Party propagation.   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
By 1987 for the vast majority of Catholics who either freely or were forced to 
submit to state domination and Party cooption, life remained a challenge.  Vietnamese 
who identified themselves as Catholics on their identification card or their curriculum 
vitae were frequently singled out and viewed the government authorities with suspicion 
as someone associated with an inherently anti-revolution and Party ideology.179  Being a 
Catholic in 1987 still made one nominally a second class citizen.  Vietnam’s policy 
towards religious groups was carried out towards the Catholic Church by first 
suppressing elements within the Church that could lead to or support active overt 
opposition to the new communist state.  Next, the government took away the Church’s 
ability and capacity to autonomously lead and guide civil society.  Finally, the 
government established means to co-opt the Church such that functionally and 
institutionally, the Church acted as a social and political agent for the VCP.  Vietnam was 
able to successfully weaken the Church to the point that the state could nominally control 
the Church and use it to promote the Party’s social and political agenda.   
During the period from 1975 to 1987 when Vietnam existed in a state of autarky, 
Vietnam was relatively isolated from the world and pursued policies with little concern 
for international opinion or consequences.  Many outside groups—including the Vatican, 
overseas Vietnamese groups, and human rights groups—opposed Vietnam’s suppression 
and denial of religious freedom in Vietnam.  However, during this period the Vietnamese 
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government had little-to-no incentive to pursue anything but its own single-minded 
agenda of rebuilding Vietnam under the socialist model. This started to change as 
Vietnam instituted the Doi Moi reforms introduced at the Sixth Party Congress in 
December 1986.  The next chapter will examine these changes and how moving from a 
state of autarky to one of complex interdependence in the global community has given 
Vietnam an incentive to adapt more to international norms and how this has produced a 
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IV. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN VIETNAM, 1987 – 2004 
The Doi Moi reforms in 1986 marked the beginning of Vietnam’s reentrance into 
the integrating international economy and world community.  This also marked the 
beginning of a gradual change in the VCP’s view towards and treatment of the Catholic 
Church.  The desire to improve its economy and to consolidate its power led the 
Vietnamese communists to seek trade and diplomatic relations with western nations and 
multilateral organizations.  While Vietnam is not explicitly beholden to the norms of its 
new trading or multilateral partners, it has of necessity become increasingly sensitive to 
the norms of its new partners in order to maintain sustained and viable economic 
relations.  Human rights, which includes freedom of religion, is one of such collective 
norms set.   
In 1996, ten years after implementing the Doi Moi reforms, Cardinal Pham Dinh 
Tung of the Hanoi Archdiocese expressed optimism that the situation for the Catholic 
Church in Vietnam would improve after years of repression because of the arrival of 
foreign investment and the increased accompanying international pressure for 
liberalization.180  How has the situation for the Catholic Church in Vietnam improved 
because of globalization?  To answer this question, this chapter will explore how 
Vietnam’s integration into the international community has affected the Catholic Church 
in Vietnam. 
I examine the effects of globalization on the Catholic Church in Vietnam in six 
areas: the official Vietnamese view of the Catholic Church in Vietnam, the extent of 
change in Vatican interaction with Vietnam, the autonomy of Catholic the Church’s role 
in society, Church activity levels, regulations on religion, and general international views 
on the state of religion in Vietnam.  The subsequent study of these six areas will provide 
indications which show how the situation for the Catholic Church in Vietnam has 
improved since Vietnam immerged from its state of autarky and entered an era of 
international integration.  
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 A. CHANGING VCP VIEWS TOWARD THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
The VCP’s view of the Catholic Church has changed dramatically in the last 
twenty years.  There are indications that the VCP’s shift of attitude towards the Catholic 
Church also mirror an internal, more subdued, gradual opening up towards the Church.  
Vietnam’s international integration beginning in 1986 is the chief catalyst driving the 
VCP’s improved view of the Church.    
During Vietnam’s period of autarky (1976-1986), the government’s policy was to 
marginalize the Catholic Church and co-opt the Church into being a state – controlled 
means of implementing VCP policy.  The Sixth National Party Congress, which marked 
the beginning of Vietnam’s shift towards a policy of engaging and interacting with the 
global community, also enunciated the beginning of a change in the official view towards 
religion and the Catholic Church in particular.  During the Congress, the new Secretary-
General of the VCP, Nguyen Van Linh, specifically promised to implement measures to 
respect religious freedom and improve relations with the Catholic Church.181   
As the Doi Moi reforms took hold, Vietnam shifted its approach to dealing with 
the Catholic Church from one which the UNHCR labeled persecution and discrimination 
to what Auxiliary Bishop of Hanoi Francois-Xavier Nguyen Van Sang described to the 
Pope during a visit the Vatican in October 1987 as one of “détente and openness.”182  By 
the Seventh National Party Congress held in 1990, the VCP’s perception of the Catholic 
Church as an “instrument of westernization and colonization” began to give way to 
attitudes, at least on the surface, which appeared to embrace religion and the Catholic 
Church as an important player in Vietnamese society.183
The Seventh National Party Congress report emphatically stated, “most people 
have a spiritual need for religions and beliefs; this need will persist for a long time to 
come,” and “there are a number of aspects to religious teachings which are particularly 
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useful for building a new society.”184  This was the first public admission by the VCP of 
the utility of religion in building a new, VCP-led, society.     
Commenting further on the improving situation for religious freedom in Vietnam, 
the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Religious Freedom made 
the following observations in a report submitted to the United Nations’ Commission of 
Human Rights in 1998: 
Since the policy of openness was introduced in 1990, there have generally 
been some positive developments, in particular the Government’s 
recognition of the  positive role of religions and the fact that it is 
moving away from an anti-religious  policy and towards the authorization, 
with a framework that is well defined, limited and controlled by the 
authorities, of religious practice and the building of  places of worship.185  
The Special Rapporteur’s comments indicated the Vietnamese government was giving 
religious institutions more room to maneuver, but within the confines of continued rigid 
regulations and policies governing belief systems and religious institutions.  
The Party seeks to gain international credit for the Church’s good works by 
working with it.  In the international arena, rather than be perceived as a suppressor and 
persecutor of religion, a view that wins no favor with the international community, 
Vietnam wants to come across as a state that works with religious organizations in a 
harmonious effort to advance Vietnam and alleviate suffering and poverty.  In reality, 
while the government gives religious organizations more room to maneuver, the 
government only gives leeway to secure international public relations points.  At the end 
of the day, religions are still persecuted, yet at the same time, the VCP has recognized the 
utilitarian value of religion and decided to more fully incorporate and embrace religion in 
state policy. 
There are several indications that this is the Party’s plan towards religious 
institutions and the Catholic Church in particular.  In 1996 the Party called on the 
Catholics to “contribute more to the development of society and the drive to modernize 
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the nation.”186  This is significant in two ways.  First, by calling upon the Catholic 
Church to “contribute”, the Party implied that the Church has positive relevance to 
society.  Second, it recognized the significant role the Church has in “modernizing” 
Vietnam.  This indicates that the Party has finally separated the long held stigma of 
French colonialism and modernization from the Catholic Church. 
The government now relies upon and makes requests to the Church in ways which 
were previously unimaginable.  In 1997, thousands of Catholics protested in Dong Nai 
province over expropriation of Church property and allegations that state authorities were 
selling Church properties.  Riot police were brought in to quell the mayhem.  In spite of 
an obvious connection to religion, government officials were extremely reticent to draw a 
connection between the riots and the Church.187  However, behind closed doors, local 
Dong Nai authorities requested senior Catholic Bishop Paul Marie Nguyen Minh Nhat to 
intervene and issue a statement calling for peace.188  This is an example of the 
government relying on the Church because they  determined it was not in their best 
interest inflict a severe and violent crack down that could potentially garner much 
negative international attention.  This example does not necessarily reflect a change in 
national policy, but it does reflect the willingness of local Party leaders to work with 
Church leaders and seek their help.  It also shows the government’s awareness and 
sensitivity to international pressures.  The situation reflects a softening of what was once 
a very harsh position towards the Catholic Church.  
Another example of a general relaxation of the government’s posture and view 
towards the Catholic Church is the story of Cardinal Francois Xavier Nguyen Van Thuan.  
In 1975, then Bishop Thuan was imprisoned for 13 years by the new communist 
government because of personal ties to former Republic of Vietnam President Ngo Dinh 
Diem.  After release he was subjected to house arrest and continual persecution.  Finally 
in 1991 he was forced into exile.  While working in the Vatican, as the head of the 
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Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Bishop Thuan was elevated to the College of 
Cardinals.  In 2001, Cardinal Thuan was finally given permission to return to Vietnam on 
a tourist visa.189  In 2002 when Cardinal Thuan died, Vietnamese officials did not 
interfere or attempt to discourage a memorial mass for the late Cardinal.190  Why the 
change?  It appears likely the government dissociated Cardinal Thuan from its previous 
suspicions to take advantage of the positive image.  At the same time, Cardinal Thuan, 
was the second ever Vietnamese Cardinal.  The fact the VCP eventually changed its 
position and allowed Cardinal Thuan to return to Vietnam and allowed Vietnamese 
Catholics to hold memorial masses is a strong indication of the VCP’s change in view 
towards the Catholic Church.   
 
B. STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS WITH THE VATICAN 
A unique aspect of the Catholic Church is the Vatican.  The Vatican as a state can 
establish state-to-state relations.  The trend of official  rapprochement experienced 
between the Vatican and Hanoi during the last 15 years is another indicator of the VCP’s 
improved view of the Catholic Church.  The basic course of rapprochement between the 
Vatican and Hanoi has followed Vietnam’s post-Doi Moi integration with the 
international community.   
The Seventh Party Congress in 1991 officially enunciated Vietnam’s new 
orientation in foreign policy.  The party congress report stated: "Vietnam wishes to be a 
friend of all countries in the world community striving for peace, independence, and 
development."191  In 1989 Vietnam had diplomatic relations with only 23 nations; by 
1996, this number had grown to 163.192  The Vatican was not among the 140 nations 
with whom Vietnam established diplomatic relations from 1990 to 1995 when it 
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reoriented its foreign policy following the Seventh Party Congress.  However, 
discussions between the two began in earnests during this period.   
The leading sources of tension between the Vatican and Hanoi were Hanoi’s 
reluctance to restore land confiscated from the Church in 1975 and Hanoi’s refusal to 
accept the Vatican’s episcopal nominations—Hanoi wanted the Vatican to seek 
government clearance for all appointments in the priesthood. 
The first official visit to Vietnam by Vatican officials came in 1990.  This 
inaugurated a regular series of visits between Hanoi and the Vatican to discuss issues 
concerning Catholics in Vietnam.  From 1990-2004, the Vatican and Vietnamese officials 
have met eleven times hold discussions.  At the time of this writing Vietnam and the 
Vatican have not yet established formal diplomatic relations.  However, considerable 
progress towards establishing diplomatic relations has been made in the past fifteen years 
in spite of many ups and downs.   
In 1992, the Vatican and Hanoi laid the ground work for dealing with one of the 
main points of contention between the two: the selection process and ordination of new 
bishops.  The Vatican long held it had the right to autonomously make episcopal 
appointments.  Hanoi, on the other hand posited it had to ensure that only supporters of 
the revolution became social leaders in Vietnam.  As such, the VCP claimed the right to 
dictate who did or did not become Catholic priests.  During the 1992 talks between the 
Vatican and Hanoi, an agreement was established under which the Vatican would submit 
names of would-be bishops for the government’s approval.  The agreement allowed the 
Vatican to stay in control of the selection process; however, the Vietnamese government 
got to exercise veto power and have the last say in the process. 
Talks on the appointment of bishops between the Vatican and Hanoi broke down 
in early 1995 and then after 18 months in October 1996, talks resumed.193  The Church 
was not ordaining enough priests or sustaining enough priests to keep up with attrition.  
When a bishop died many dioceses were left empty, without a leader, or grossly 
undermanned.  The Vatican representatives rigorously negotiated with VCP officials to 
                                                 
193 “Holy See Tries Diplomatic Approach to Vietnam,” Catholic World News [home page on-line]; 
14 October 1996; available from http://www.cwnews.com/news/storytools.cfm?task= print&recnum 
=2595; Internet; accessed 14 January 2005.  
 60
clear episcopal nominations in order to alleviate the scarcity of church leaders.  In 1999 
the Hanoi archdiocese had approximately 400,000 Catholics with 130 parishes which 
were all about 5 to 20 kilometers apart connected by poor roads.  The diocese had only 40 
priests.  This equated to each priest having to administer to 10,000 Catholics each.  A 
more extreme example of the scarcity issue with which the Vatican was striving to rectify 
was in the Lang Son diocese located in the mountainous border regime next to China.  In 
1999, the diocese had one 97-year old priest to administer to 16 parishes scattered 
throughout the mountainous diocese.194  Clearly in a situation like this, the Church could 
not expect to sustain or support itself.  The Vatican worked urgently to fix these types of 
situations. 
Another chief Vatican goal in the talks was to move Hanoi and the Vatican closer 
to achieving official diplomatic relations.  The rational was that if the Vatican and Hanoi 
establish diplomatic relations, it would be more difficult for the VCP to restrict the 
religious freedom of Catholics.  Catholics in Vietnam would have an official diplomatic 
outlet of recourse in the event of VCP meddling into Church affairs.  
The year 1999 marked an acute improvement in public VCP rhetoric towards the 
Vatican.  In 1999, Hanoi gave indications it might be ready to seriously begin 
establishing relations with the Vatican.  During a press conference following the 1999 
talks, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson told reporters that the question of 
diplomatic ties with the Vatican would be on the agenda for the upcoming talks.195  
Another indicator or warning relations also came during the 1999 talks.  During the talks, 
the Vietnamese government showed favorable signs toward the possibility of a Papal visit 
to Vietnam.196   
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A significant step taken by Hanoi towards advancing relations with the Vatican 
took place in December 2002 when Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister Wu Khoang was 
the first high ranking official of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to visit the Vatican.  
His visit focused on discussions concerning the need to intensify the cooperation between 
church and state for the benefit of all Vietnamese society.197  Regular dialogue between 
the Vatican and Hanoi continues; however, diplomatic relations have not yet been 
established and no Papal visit has taken place.  
The Vatican’s regular visits to Vietnam have afforded Hanoi an opportunity to 
enjoy the positive international image of meeting officially with the head of a major 
world religion.  The VCP uses its developing relationship with the Vatican to make 
favorable public comments about the Catholic Church in an attempt to shape the 
international opinion of Vietnam to one of religious toleration, freedom, and acceptance.  
For instance after the departure of the Vatican delegation in June 2001, Vietnamese 
government officials stated that they viewed “the Catholic Church as a positive force.”198  
During the May 2004 talks, the Hanoi formally and publicly asserted to Vatican officials 
that Vietnamese Catholics are full and productive citizens.199  The VCP may have great 
differences with the Vatican, but at the same time the VCP uses its developing 
relationship with the head of an international religion as a showpiece of international 
positive public relations.  Vietnam wants to show the world that it deals with religions in 
a constructive manner.  
In sum, while formal diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the Vatican have 
not yet been achieved, the regular talks have been beneficial for both parties.  The Church 
has secured increasing numbers of papal episcopal appointments which have helped ease 
the dearth of Church officials in Vietnam.  Vietnam has been able to improve its 
international image, address ways for the Catholic Church to best meet and help further 
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the VCP’s agenda, and maximize its power and control over the Catholic Church while 
minimizing the perception of overt control and suppression. 
 
C. THE AUTONOMY OF THE CATHOLIC PRIESTHOOD 
One of the VCP’s strategies to weakening the control of the Church over 
parishioners was to marginalize and thus weaken Church leadership.  Without strong 
leadership, Catholics’ ties to the Church would weaken and consequently the support and 
loyalty of Vietnamese Catholics would then be more easily be channeled towards the 
Party.  A primary method of achieving this was to decrease the number of priests. 
This rigid vetting and screening process gave the VCP broad room and 
justification to keep the number of priests and bishops low by vetoing ordinations.  The 
VCP uses other, at times capricious, means to influence who becomes a priest or bishop.  
An example of this influence took place in 1997 upon the return of Vietnamese bishops 
from their ad limina visit with the Pope.  While at the Vatican the Vietnamese bishops 
prepared a confidential list of 41 candidates for various open episcopal offices in 
Vietnam.  Upon reentry into Vietnam, the list was discovered and seized by police while 
the bishops were going through customs.  The VCP then published the list in newspapers  
to influence who the Church would nominate for episcopal office.200
The government also held up nominations for key episcopal offices.  This took 
place in the Archdiocese of Ho Chi Minh City—the largest of Vietnam’s three 
archdiocese.  In July 1995, Archbishop Paul Nguyen Van Binh died leaving the 
archbishopric of the Ho Chi Minh City Archdiocese empty.  The VCP refused to accept 
the Vatican’s nomination to fill the empty archbishopric for three years.  Finally, in April 
1998, after much negotiation between the Vatican and Hanoi, Archbishop Jean-Baptiste 
Pham Minh Man was installed as the new Archbishop.  The fact that the VCP forced the 
largest archdiocese in Vietnam to remain empty served to weaken the Church.201  The 
appointment of a new archbishop in Ho Chi Minh City after three years was a sign that 
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Hanoi still wanted to ensure it could influence who became Church leaders.  At the same 
time, the Vatican’s successful negations to appointment Archbishop Man indicate the 
VCP’s position towards the Church was softening and its willingness to compromise with 
the Church was increasing. 
In 1999, nine priests were ordained by Archbishop Man in Ho Chi Minh City.  All 
the new priests were members of Catholic orders.202  Catholic orders were traditionally 
regarded by the VCP with particular suspicion because they belong to international 
organizations.  The fact that nine members of an international Catholic order were 
ordained serves as a small sign of opening toward religion.203    
In September 2003 the Vatican announced that Archbishop Jean-Batiste Pham 
Minh Man would be elevated to the rank of Cardinal.  Immediately after the 
announcement, Vietnam’s Committee for Religious Affairs refused to recognize the 
appointment on grounds that it had not been consulted first.  After an open apology from 
the Vatican to the government of Vietnam and two days of discussion, the Vietnamese 
government changed its position and accepted the appointment.204  This was the first 
time that such a high appointment was resolved without the sending of a special 
delegation from the Vatican to Hanoi to engage in extensive negotiations.  The 
government congratulated the new Cardinal, welcomed him as Vietnam’s new second 
cardinal, and stated that having him as a Cardinal was an “honor for everyone in 
Vietnam.”205  Vietnam’s religious-affairs minister said that Vietnam was “happy to count 
a Catholic cardinal among its citizens.”206 Cardinal Man reported that the quick 
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acceptance of the appointment was “a sign of warming between relations between the 
government of Vietnam” and the Church.207  The quick change in position suggests the 
increasing importance of international image and opinion to the VCP.  From the VCP 
perspective, counting a high ranking Catholic figure as one of Vietnam’s own is a 
tangible sign to the world that Vietnam has religious freedom.  
Regular talks between the Vatican and Hanoi have greatly helped improve the 
position of the Church in Vietnam.  Negotiations over nominations to fill vacant 
bishoprics have been a top agenda item during all talks between Vatican and Hanoi.  
Without the Vatican, an international and independent actor, acting on behalf of the 
priesthood candidates and bishop nominees, the Catholic Church in Vietnam today would 
have far fewer priests and bishops.  The role Vatican officials have played in lobbying 
Hanoi officials have greatly helped the Catholic Church keep its leadership positions 
filled. 
This is evident by looking the number of Bishops ordained per year.  While 
Vietnam was in a period of autarky from 1976 to 1986, only four   bishops were 
ordained.  Since Doi Moi was launched in 1986, and especially after the Vatican and 
Hanoi began holding regular talks in 1990, 27 bishops have been ordained.  Twenty-six 
of the 27 ordinations took place after the Vatican and Hanoi began holding regular talks 
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Socialist Vietnam had restricted the ability of Catholic priests to freely travel in 
their respected parish or diocese in order to administer to their parishioners and carry out 
their ecclesiastical responsibilities.  While there have been many increases in the ability 
of the Catholic Church to operate and perform religious functions and duties, priests are 
still limited to moving freely within their assigned parish.  Travel outside their parish 
requires permission from local government and party leaders.  Because many priests are 
assigned to more than one parish, the government can impede Church operations by not 
granting permission for a priest to travel out of his primary parish. 
During a special meeting with the Pope in 1996, Vietnamese bishops reported to 
the Pope that priests are always under surveillance.209  Due to tight surveillance, priests 
find there is no way around the difficult paperwork and frequently capricious process of 
getting permission to visit all their assigned parishioners.  Because of the restrictions 
against traveling outside of one’s parish or diocese, priests cannot organize meetings of 
the laity as needed.  The laity can only meet when under the existing officially sanctioned 
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gatherings or by obtaining special permission.  This gives the government control over 
the laity in that only the government can authorize a meeting of all Vietnamese priests.  
In 1999 Cardinal Pham Dinh Tung of the Hanoi Archdiocese sent a letter to Prime 
Minister Pham Van Khai complaining of restrictions on the Catholic Church in Vietnam.  
Specifically, he argued priests face a “bureaucratic minefield” when attempting to gain 
permission to travel within their own parishes.210  Additionally, Cardinal Tung 
complained of numerous and frequent delays with applications to reassign priests within 
parishes.  
Ostensibly, the situation has improved somewhat.  The U.S. State Department’s 
International Religious Freedom Report in 2004, reported that the Vietnamese 
government “allowed many Catholic bishops and priests to travel freely within their 
dioceses and allowed greater, but sometimes restricted, freedom for domestic travel 
outside these areas.”211  While there are still restrictions on the free movement and travel, 
the report specifically notes that that the situation has improved.  The report does not, 
however, specify to what degree freedom of travel has improved.   It does point out 
however, that travel area in ethnic areas is especially restrictive.   As for freedom to 
assign priests, the report points out that Catholic leaders were able to assign priests “more 
easily than in the past, even in some remote areas where no priests had been assigned for 
decades.”212  
This report is indicative of a positive trend towards increasing freedom or travel.  
Priests still have to obtain permission to travel, but that permission is given much more 
readily today.  As Vietnam becomes increasingly internationally integrated, domestic 
freedom of travel for priests seems to be slowly improving.   
Another area of Church-State-relations where one can found improvements in the 
Catholic priesthood’s freedom of performing its officials duties is the interaction between 
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priests and the international Catholic community that over the past 15 years Prior to the 
implementation of Doi Moi in 1986 and well into the nineties, international travel by 
Vietnamese Catholic priests was very limited and tightly controlled by the party.  
International travel and interaction with the greater Catholic Church remains tightly 
controlled by the party today, but the ability of priests to travel and interact 
internationally has increased.   
Every five years all Catholic Bishops travel to the Vatican to attend the ad limina” 
visit with the Pope. The meeting allows Catholics to receive training, counsel, and 
maintain a sense of doctrinal purity.  During the 1996 ad limina visit only 14 of 
Vietnam’s 22 bishops received government permission to attend.213  In 2002, for the first 
time, all Vietnamese Bishops were allowed to attend the ad limina visit.  It seems 
probable that the warming relationships between the Vatican and Hanoi served to incline 
the government to allow all Bishops attend.   
The U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report in 2004 
reported that “Catholic Bishops face no restrictions on international travel, including to 
Rome, and many nuns have also been able to go abroad for study and conferences.”214  
This represents a great improvement in priests’ ability to travel internationally over just 
10 years previously. 
 
D. ROLE WITHIN CIVIL SOCIETY 
The 1996 U.S. Human Rights report on Vietnam reported that the government of 
Vietnam prohibits the Catholic Church from educational and charitable activities.215  The 
main reason for this was so the party was the main provider of social services.  
Essentially, the government wanted to minimize the Catholic Church’s impact on society 
and prevent it from challenging the party for the loyalty and devotion of the people.  
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Beginning in the mid-1990s however, the VCP began allowing the Catholic Church to 
take a much more active role in providing social services.  I attribute this increase to 
pressure the Party felt from its continued push towards international integration.216  This 
is manifest in three areas: 1) the Church’s increased ability to provide acts of Church- 
sponsored charity, 2) the opening of Catholic schools and institutions, and 3) the 
proliferation of religious NGOs. 
1. Church-Sponsored Charity 
In October 1996 during talks between the Vatican and Hanoi, Vatican officials 
made it known that they would like to “collaborate in a constructive manner” with the 
government so that the Church could work once again in the areas of education, health, 
and agriculture.217  The government tacitly agreed that such type of cooperation would be 
“desirable.”  This was a first step to returning to working in society for the Church.  The 
Vatican continued to press for the Church to play a role in society.  After the February 
1998 talks between the Vatican and Hanoi, VCP officials promised to recognize the role 
of the Catholic Church in addressing “social ills such as drugs, prostitution, and 
corruption.”218  The 1999 U.S. Human Rights Report on Vietnam suggested that Vietnam 
did in fact act on its words.  The report stated that the government has “relaxed its 
prohibition on Catholic Church’s participation in religious education and charitable 
activities.”219
In 1999 Vietnam faced some of the worst flooding in 35 years.  The devastation 
resulted in 600 deaths and 600,000 destroyed homes.220  The floods afforded the Church 
an opportunity to see if the government would in fact allow it to provide organized relief 
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to flood victims.  Vietnamese Church leaders freely leveraged domestic and international 
Catholic resources to provide relief to flood victims.  The Pope sent U.S. $100 thousand.  
The money was given to bishops to then be distributed in the seven effected provinces.221  
This was significant because the government allowed the Church to accept money from 
the Vatican and also allowed the Church to distribute the money as the Church saw fit.  
The Church enjoyed freedom from governmental oversight during the distribution of 
Vatican relief funds.   
From Vietnam, Cardinal Pham Dinh Tung of the Hanoi Archdiocese made 
appeals domestically and abroad to raise funds to provide emergency assistance for flood 
victims.222  This was the first time the government allowed the Vietnamese Church 
officials to make such a public appeal for international assistance.  The following year in 
2000, areas in southern Vietnam again faced severe flooding.  This time Archbishop John 
Pham Minh Man from the Ho Chi Minh City Archdiocese was allowed to travel to 
Europe to collect funds for flood victims in his dioceses.223   
There are several plausible explanations for why the Vietnamese government 
would now allow Church leaders to provide charity.  First, as the Vietnamese state 
became more market-driven, it became more focused on overall economic growth in the 
Vietnamese economy. A strong economy provides legitimacy to the VCP and its policies.  
Therefore, if a church which is not openly opposed to the state provides charitable needs 
to society, then if are not viewed as taking away from the state, but rather helping the 
nation get back on its feet by infusing aid to troubled areas.  By the latter 1990s and into 
the new century, the VCP and government of Vietnam felt much more comfortable with 
leaders in the Vietnamese Catholic Church.  For instance, Cardinal John Pham Minh 
Man, the second most senior leader in the Church in Vietnam, is viewed as a moderate 
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who believes in engaging and working with the VCP-led government.224  The VCP has 
allowed Catholics to more actively participate in charity and social work because it 
ultimately helps the Vietnamese economy grow and because of increased trust in senior 
Church leadership. 
2. Catholic Schools and Institutions 
Another area recently opened for Catholics to participate in society was the 
operation of schools and institutions.  Within the past five years, Catholic priests and 
nuns have begun operating kindergartens and vocational training centers.225  The main 
thrust of their work is in the area of social services.  The Church provides services which 
the government struggles to adequately provide.  The Church has reverted to providing 
traditional aid to society, such as operating orphanages, and new contemporary services 
such as operating HIV-AIDS hospices and treatment centers.  
In some areas, particularly in the south, the government readily recognizes its 
shortcomings and the Church’s abilities.  An example of this was seen in a state-operated 
HIV-AIDS treatment center in a province outside of Ho Chi Minh City.  The government 
was facing difficulty running the center.  To address the problem, the Ministry of Labor, 
War Invalids and Social Affairs asked the local Catholic dioceses to work with the 
government to manage and operate the treatment program.226  This type of Church and 
state cooperation reflects the overall increased acceptance of the Church’s active role in 
society.  The 2004 U.S. State Department report on Vietnam positively reports that 
“Catholic priests and nuns continue to operate orphanages, vocational centers, and health 
clinics with the knowledge of the government.”227
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3. Foreign Non-governmental Organizations 
The Catholic Church’s role within society has been bolstered by the proliferation 
of foreign non-governmental agencies who operate in Vietnam today. Catholic Relief 
Services (CRS) has worked in Vietnam since 1994 as a registered foreign NGO.  CRS 
focuses on support to education, emergency situations, agriculture, and microfinance 
projects.  In 2004, Catholic Relief Services officially opened its first office in Hanoi.    
In 2004, there were 450 international foreign based non-governmental 
organizations registered with People’s Aid Coordinating Committee.228   At least 50 of 
the 450 were religious-based NGOs.  These foreign based religious NGOs are allowed to 
carry out projects which are not religiously affiliated.  Additionally, these NGOs are not 
allowed to assist Vietnamese religious groups carry out humanitarian activities. 
 
E. LEVEL OF ACTIVITY 
In addition to the Church’s increased participation in providing social services, a 
brief examination of changes in the overall Church activity level is also helpful in 
exposing areas in which the ability to practice religion has increased for Catholics in 
Vietnam.  Unfortunately, easily quantifiable data on overall church attendance for given 
dioceses are unavailable.  However, other available indicators do show a positive increase 
in Church activity levels.  These indicators are, first the resumption of Vietnam’s largest 
Catholic pilgrimage and Catholic festival, second, the comparison of basic Church 
statistics from 1998 to statistics from 2004, third, observations made in reports by 
international observers on positive changes in Church activity in Vietnam.  
1. The La Vang Pilgrimage  
In 1798, the Virgin Mary was believed to have appeared to a group of Catholics 
fleeing troops sent by Emperor Canh Tinh.  Near the village of La Vang, the Holy Mother 
reportedly sheltered and gave guidance to the pursued group.  Years later during French 
colonization, a church was built at the site to commemorate the apparition.  Beginning in 
1901, every third year on August 15 thousands of Catholic faithful made the pilgrimage 
to La Vang to celebrate the visitation of the Virgin Mary.  The La Vang pilgrimage and 
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festival is the largest gathering in Vietnam.229  The pilgrimage and festival was cancelled 
in 1975 when the Communist took over the South.230
During the war with the United States, the shrine to the Holy Mother at La Vang 
also became knows as a symbol of anti-communism.  In 1961, former president of the 
Republic of Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, led a pilgrimage of over 250,000 Vietnamese 
there.  Because of the pilgrimage’s ability to assemble huge numbers of people for non-
state sanctioned reasons and its association with Ngo Dinh Diem and anti-communism, 
the Vietnamese government attempted to block the pilgrimage and ban the associated 
festival.    The VCP saw in the La Vang pilgrimage a probable anti-communist rallying 
point.  
Small numbers of devout Catholics continued to attempt the pilgrimage from 
1975 to 1988.  During this time period, however, the government openly opposed and 
prevented pilgrims from making the pilgrimage.231  The pilgrimage and festival resumed 
in 1988 when the Archbishop of Hue defied police threats and openly led pilgrims to the 
church at La Vang.232  The police did not stop the pilgrims and the pilgrimage was 
successful.  Since 1988 the pilgrimage has continued uninterrupted.  In 1996, the number 
of pilgrims exceeded 100,000 people.233
The two hundredth anniversary of the aberration of the Virgin Mary at La Vang 
provided a special case for the VCP to see how it would deal with what promised to be 
not only a large draw in the domestic arena but also internationally.  In anticipation of the 
huge crowds for the 200th anniversary, and in an attempt to minimize what could become 
a huge crowd, the Vietnamese government imposed restrictions on travel to La Vang 
during the time of the pilgrimage and celebration.  The government stated that the 
restrictions were simply a part of the government’s policy of thrift as it was an attempted 
to recover from the 1997 Asia economic crisis.  Specifically, the government banned the 
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advertisement of the pilgrimage and also banned travel firms from taking foreigners to 
the festival.234  The VCP saw an exceptionally large gathering at La Vang as allowing 
anti-government elements to mobilize the attendees against the Party.  Nevertheless, 
Catholic bishops encouraged the festival and freely relayed the Pope’s message to 
Vietnam which encouraged participation in the pilgrimage to commemorate the 200th 
anniversary of the Virgin Mary’s apparition.235  In the end, over 200,000 Vietnamese 
made the pilgrimage in spite of the governments’ attempts to dissuade pilgrims.236  The 
dissuasion was limited to rhetoric and did not extend to open action to oppose the 
pilgrimage as in years past.237
The resumption of the La Vang festival is a significant indicator of increased 
religious activity in several ways.  First, a massive gathering not controlled by the VCP 
was allowed.  This showed a degree of tolerance of civil society which was completely 
absent during Vietnam’s period of autarky.  Second, the festival associated with the 
pilgrimage was originally cast by the VCP as an anti-communist event.   By allowing the 
festival to take place, the VCP is able to show case the pilgrimage and festival as an 
example of religious freedom in Vietnam.  The change in the VCP’s behavior  towards 
religious festivals from the period of autarky to the period of international integration 
suggests that such integration helped inspire the VCP to ease restrictions on religious 
activity. 
2. Comparison of Church Statistics from 1998 to 2004 
A simple comparison of Church statistics, clearly shows the Catholic Church in 
Vietnam is growing:     
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Table 2. General Statistics about Vietnam.238
 1998 2004 
Total Catholics 4,952,605 5,303,445 
Priests 2200 2410 
Bishops 33 36 
Seminarians  548 1,044 
  
The Vatican’s information agency reported in 2002 that the Catholic Church in 
Vietnam grew by 14.4 percent from 1997-2002 while the Vietnamese general population 
grew by only 5.3 percent.239  This indicates the reasons for the increase in the total 
number of Catholics from 1998 to 2004 is a result of new members joining the Church, 
not just a natural increase in population.  An increase in the number of converts indicates 
some working missionary or proselytizing program.  This in turn indicates a certain 
amount of freedom necessary to perform a proselystization program.  Even though during 
this period the government continued to impose restrictions on the Catholic Church in 
Vietnam, the Church enjoyed enough freedom to grow.  Also, the increased numbers of 
priest and bishops is significant in that it shows the VCP allowed the Catholic clergy to 
actually increase in size.  The doubling of the number priesthood candidates who can 
enter the seminary in the last five years is very significant.  Church leaders in Vietnam 
have long complained that the government does not allow enough Catholics to enter the 
seminary in order to keep up with the Church needs.  The fact the number of seminarians 
has doubled indicates the government is less concerned about keeping the number 
seminary students low.  This statistic does not, however, indicate whether or not the 
government will allow the increased number or seminarians to actually be ordained and 
become priests.  This remains to be seen.  
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3. International Observations of Increased Church Activity  
One of the most consistent indicators of increased activity in the Catholic Church 
in Vietnam comes from the observations and reports from numerous international 
organizations and NGO’s operating in Vietnam.  Taken as whole, these reports point 
towards the same overall trend of an increase in religious freedom and increased attention 
to religious observances. 
During a visit to the Vatican in 1996, bishops reported that at the parish level, 
daily life was good for Catholics.  The bishops reported Catholics were able to attend 
mass, receive sacraments, and pray with their family in their home.240  Most telling is 
how every U.S. State Department report on religion in Vietnam from 1996 through 2004 
reports increased participation in religious activities.   The 1996 report described the 
increase in religious participation as an “increase spread of religious activities.”241  The 
1997 report described religious participation as “spread[ing] significantly” throughout the 
country.242  Beginning in 1998, each report through 2004 has reported that “participation 
in religious activities throughout the country continued to grow significantly.”243   These 
reports show many areas in which religious freedom in Vietnam is still lacking.  
However, they all consistently show a sustained increase in religious participation 
throughout the country. 
Catholics in Vietnam still face restrictions in their ability to actively participate in 
Church and other religious activities.  However, since Vietnam immerged from isolation 
it has begun to engage the world, religious activity has consistently grown.  This trend 
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indicates a correlation between increased exposure to international influences and norms 
to increased religious activity. 
 
F. CHANGES IN GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS OF RELIGION 
The basic framework with which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam regulates 
religious institutions was first laid out in Resolution 287 in 1977244.  Resolution 287 
remained in effect unchanged until 1991 when Decree 69 superseded it.  In 1999 a new 
decree on religion, Decree 26, was implemented.  Finally, in November 2004, the 
“Ordinance on Belief and Religion” was brought into effect superseding the previous 
decree.  In spite of three rewrites to the law governing religion and religious institutions, 
the basics of Resolution 287 have remained essentially intact.245  Cardinal Pham Dinh 
Tung expressed a sentiment common in Vietnam about new religious laws.  In reference 
to the 1999 Decree on Religion, the Cardinal stated that it is not much different from 
earlier decrees.246  While the laws remain basically the same—subjecting religious 
freedom and subjecting religious institutions to state control—changes in the laws after 
Doi Moi reflect a subtle improvement in the VCP’s view and treatment of religious 
institutions.  
Decree on Religion 26 in 1999 gives people the right to freely exercise religion, 
with the significant caveat that the government retains absolute control and say over 
religion.247  The politburo stated that “the government will issue regulations and detailed 
guidance for activities of religious orders and groups, on fund raising and financial 
operations, humanitarian activities, building and repairing places or worship, religious 
training and other activities.”248  The 2004 decree encourages religions to engage in 
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certain types of charity activity.249  The decree also suggests the government is more 
prepared to allow religious institutions and individuals to participate in humanitarian 
work without acquiring specific government support first.250  The decree specifies that 
the government encourages charity activities be done “according to the law.”  The 
inclusion of the terms like “humanitarian” and “charity” activities in the 1999 and 2004 
laws is a new subtle recognition that religion has a legitimate role in society in addition to 
purely religious functions.  
The 1999 and 2004 laws also make fewer references to direct state control of 
religion.  This is likely an attempt by the VCP to counter its critics and change the 
international perception of Vietnam as a country that suppresses and controls religion.  
Discussing the new 2004 law on religion, Vietnamese leaders stated that the “state needs 
to allow greater religious freedom if for no other reason than to enhance the 
government’s image.”251
 
G. A TACIT INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS 
A telling indicator of the increased ability to exercise religion among Catholic in 
Vietnam today is the tacit international consensus that the situation is slowly but steadily 
improving.  Every international organization, NGO, or government report on the human 
rights or religious freedom in Vietnam shows abuses to religious freedom in Vietnam and 
areas in which the government could improve religious freedom; however, they also all 
tell another, not so explicit implicit, story: over the last ten years Vietnam has 
experienced sustained improvements in the area of religious freedom. 
During his 10-day visit to Vietnam in 1998, United Nations Special Rapporteur 
for Human Rights and Religious Freedom, Abdelfattah Amor, found religion to function 
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“as an instrument of policy rather than a component of society.”252  Mr. Amor reported 
that Vietnam’s tight control over religion was intended to prevent the emergence of any 
group that might challenge the VCP.  In spite of problems, he noted that since 1990, the 
Vietnamese government has in fact made some improvements in its “anti-religious” 
policies.253  Assessing the situation for religion in Vietnam for good and for ill, Amor 
reported: 
Vietnamese policy on religious matters generally reflects, on the one hand, 
a gradual improvement in religious freedom, but in very limited areas 
subject to restrictions and, on  the other, the maintenance of restrictions 
and checks by  authorities anxious to prevent the establishment of 
organizations capable of  questioning their authority and influence.254
 
The significant point is that there have been improvements, even through, as the 
Special Rapporteur states, they are in “very limited areas.”  He comments on what is 
driving this change in Vietnam:  
Vietnam’s religious policy has undergone changes since 1990, Radical 
changes in the  world resulting from the end of the cold war and fall of the 
Berlin Wall, together with globalization, have induced the authorities to 
become more open in  an effort to maintain their hold on power.255
This process has resulted in more freedom of religion for Catholics.  As this 
process of globalization is intensified, it will likely produce more freedoms.  
In addition to consistent reporting of increased religious participation in U.S. 
State Department reports on religion in Vietnam other organizations draw similar 
conclusions about religious activity in Vietnam.256  Amnesty International reported:  “In 
the years following reunification in Viet Nam, religious activity was very tightly 
controlled … While there is now a greater degree of religious freedom in Viet Nam than 
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there was a decade ago, restrictions remain.”257  This report by Amnesty International, 
which goes to great length to document continued restrictions and abuses against religion, 
suggests that even one of the traditionally hardest judges of states’ human rights records 
accepts that Vietnam  is changing in accordance with international norms.   
In addition the comments and testimony of many international organizations and 
their representatives who have visited Vietnam and commented on the state of religion 
attest to this change.  They too indicate the existence of a tacit international consensus 
that there religious freedom is slowly improving in Vietnam.  In 2004 during a Senate 
hearing discussing the future of U.S.-Vietnamese relations in the context of trade and 
human rights, John Hanford, United States Ambassador-at-Large for International 
Religious Freedom, testified that during his recent visit to Vietnam he saw things 
improving for religion.  Ambassador Hanford testified: 
My Staff and I did indeed observe flourishing religious activity in many 
places  and in  many faiths, and of course we regard the relative freedom 
these believers enjoy as a welcome development.258   
During the same hearing, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew P. Daley testified 
that in some areas Vietnam today is “a less repressive society now than ten, or even five 
years ago.”259  Specifically, Assistant Secretary Daley testified that reports coming our to 
the U.S. embassy in Vietnam indicate freedom of religion has expanded.260
Positive reports concerning the situation of religion in Vietnam are not just 
limited to U.S. government reports.  In 1999, the United States National Conference of 
Catholics sent a delegation to Vietnam.  Upon completion of the visit, the Archbishop 
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who led the group reported new signs of religious tolerance.261  More recently in 2004 
during a visit to Hanoi, a senior Vatican official reported that he feels “religious freedom 
is expanding in Vietnam” in spite of the fact much work still needs to be done.262   
 
H. VCP RECOGNITION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
Vietnam’s burgeoning international trade relationships have also impacted 
Vietnam’s view and treatment of religion.  As Vietnam signs or enters into sought-after 
trading relationships, concessions to ensure human rights and religious freedom are often 
included in the agreement.  Many of Vietnam’s new economic partners strive to ensure 
they are not trading with or supporting a regime which abuses human rights and 
suppresses freedom of religion.  Two brief examples of this are Vietnam’s relation with 
the European Union and the United States—both major trading partners.  In 1995 the 
European Union and Vietnam signed trade agreements which covered trade, investment, 
and human rights.  In 1997, 2000, 2001, and most recently in 2003, the European 
Parliament passed a resolution condemning human rights violations in Vietnam, 
especially the suppression of religious groups.  Each time Vietnam adamantly disputed 
the resolutions and accused the European Parliament of meddling in Vietnam’s internal 
affairs.263  In 2001 Vietnam and the United States ratified a bilateral trade agreement.  In 
2003, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that the United States was 
Vietnam’s largest single export market with 21.75 percent of Vietnam’s total exports.264  
European Union countries made up another 23.91 percent of Vietnams export market.265 
Vietnam does not bow to the United States or the European Union, but with such a large 
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percentage of its foreign export market, Vietnam cannot turn a deaf ear to international 
pressures from the United States or the European Union.  Religious sources from within 
Vietnam have argued that diplomatic pressure and intervention, particularly from the 
United States, is a major reason why the Vietnamese government has granted more 
religious freedoms and legalized more religious groups.266
As Vietnam establishes diplomatic relations and trading relations with the United 
States, the European Union, and others, they began pressuring and lobbying for increases 
in freedom of religion, human rights, and other forms of liberalization in Vietnam.  
Vietnam’s increasingly complex degree of interdependence makes the potential cost of 
not listening to and implementing the international norms and standards increasingly 
costly for Vietnam.  The VCP wants to ensure trade and development continues so it can 
maintain legitimacy and stay in power.  During Vietnam’s period of autarky, the 
government had little incentive to listen to or follow anyone else’s standards.  Today 
though, this is not the case.    
 
I. CONCLUSION 
Participation in religious activities, and to a lesser degree, freedom of religion, has 
generally improved for the Catholic Church in Vietnam since Vietnam began embracing 
globalization in 1987.  Vietnam still actively restricts and controls the Catholic Church, 
but the degree of restriction and control today is significantly less than compared to 
during Vietnam’s period of autarky.  Many positive changes in the VCP’s view and 
treatment of the Catholic Church have followed Vietnam’s integration into the global 
economy and community.  As Vietnam has become more internationally interdependent, 
Vietnam has become increasingly sensitive to international norms and standards: if not 
fully embracing them, it at least maintains the appearance of gradually adopting 
international norms and standards.   
                                                 
266 U.S. Department of State,  Country Report on Human Rights Practices—2004: Vietnam (Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) 30 January 2005; Sec 2, “Freedom of Religion”; accessed at 
ttp://www.vietnamhumanrights.net/English /documents/vietnam-State04.htm; internet; viewed on 16 
November 2004.  
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To improve the government’s international image to ensure necessary economic 
relations are not damaged, Vietnam claims it provides freedom of religion.  The trend 
towards religious tolerance from 1987 to 2004 suggests that further small but substantial 
concessions to religion are likely.  Already we have seen movement on public admissions 
of religion as a positive societal force, allowing religions to participate in charity, 
permitting international travel of and substantial increases in the number of priests, and 
the resumption of large religious festivals.  As Vietnam becomes more internationally 
interconnected, the VCP seems to make more concessions and gestures of increasing 
acceptance of the Catholic Church and religious freedom.  Gradually, these gestures are 
trickling down to the people and affecting real positive change in religious freedom.  This 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Historically the Vietnamese Communist Party has distrusted and suspected the 
Catholic Church of attempting to undermine the Party’s power and legitimacy.  Inherent 
conflicts between religion and Communist ideology further exacerbated the Party’s 
negative view and treatment of the Church.  During the period of autarky from 1975 to 
1986, Vietnam charted a course apart from meaningful global economic and diplomatic 
relations.  By 1986, the VCP’s policies had pushed Vietnam’s economy and society to the 
brink of collapse.  The Party faced a legitimacy crisis far broader than any perceived 
threat from the Catholic Church.  In response, the Party instituted the Doi Moi reforms 
and slowly began liberalizing its economy and embracing the international community.  
Vietnam’s subsequent international integration resulted in a reverse course for Vietnam’s 
failing economy and a move from a position of isolation vis-à-vis the international 
community to a position of growing interdependence.  This new integration had a 
profound impact on Vietnam’s view and treatment of the Catholic Church. 
By the end of 1986, the Catholic Church was still viewed as suspect and 
inherently anti-revolutionary.  The Church was subject to numerous restrictions.  These 
restrictions resulted in the marginalization of the Catholic laity and the prevention of 
Catholics from actively exercising their faith.  Vietnam’s policies towards the Catholic 
Church were carried out by first suppressing elements within the Church that could lead 
or support overt opposition.  Next, the government took away the Church’s ability and 
capacity to autonomously lead and guide civil society.  Finally, the government 
established a means to co-opt the Church such that functionally and institutionally the 
Church would act as a social and political agent for the VCP.  The Catholic Church’s 
marginalized situation began to slowly change as Vietnam embraced the Doi Moi reforms 
after 1986.  
Vietnam’s integration into the world economy and community beginning in 1987 
led to an improved degree of religious freedom for the Catholic Church.  The restrictions 
and controls placed upon the Church during the present period of international 
interdependence compared to during autarky has decreased.  The increased degree of 
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religious freedom is evident through the improved view and treatment of the Catholic 
Church. 
The Vietnamese government may continue to harbor suspicions and reservations 
about the Catholic Church in private; however, its public pronouncements and dialogue 
with the Catholic Church as a whole are now positive.  The Party’s public view of the 
Church during in the past twenty years has changed from that of an anti-communist agent 
of the Capitalist West to that of a positive force and partner, albeit junior partner, striving 
to develop and advance Vietnamese society.   
The most dramatic public pronouncement of the Party’s changed view towards 
religion came during the Seventh Party Congress in 1991.  During this congress the Party 
recognized for the first time that "most people have a spiritual need for religions and 
[belief]" in their life.267  At this time the party also recognized that religion was 
"particularly useful for building a new society.”268  The new official view of religion 
emphasized the need for tolerance, increased freedom of worship, and to limit the 
government’s “power to interfere in religious affairs.”269  This dramatic change coincided 
with Vietnam’s plan to reach out and establish international relations with all friendly 
nations—an unlikely coincidence. 
Today, rigid requirements are still in place which require the Church to obtain 
government permission to carry out most religious functions.  However, the significant 
difference for the Church as a whole compared to during the period of autarky is today 
the government readily gives permission.  Today, as Vietnam becomes increasingly 
interdependent, Catholics can freely attend mass and the Church can more freely organize 
special meetings and gatherings.  The Vatican’s working relationship and regular 
dialogue with Hanoi is one of the most positive changes to come about during Vietnam’s 
period of integration.  Today all 25 of Vietnam’s dioceses are led by functional bishops.  
This was not the case until 2003.  During autarky, the government prevented, impeded, 
and severely delayed the ordination of new priests and bishops.  The resultant shortage of 
                                                 
267 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, “Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question 
of Religious Intolerance.” Addendum: Visit to Vietnam. 1998, par 33. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid, par 34.  
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priests and bishops in many parishes and dioceses caused the laity to be spread too thin to 
adequately administer to the needs of parishioners.  Today, as a result of regular talks 
between the Vatican and Hanoi, the number of new priests allowed by the government is 
increasing.  In addition to much increased Church activity levels, the Catholic Church is 
allowed to assist society directly in non-religious ways: running schools, hospices, and 
orphanages.  Finally, the government allows Vietnamese priests to travel oversees and 
participate in international Catholic functions and organizations.  However, in spite of 
these positive steps, international standards of religious freedom require more 
Vietnam’s integration into the international system is the main reason for the 
improvements to religious freedom.  As Vietnam decided to renovate its economy by 
adopting market reforms and embracing international markets, Vietnam quickly realized 
that to be successful, it needed to be respected by other members of the international 
community or at least avoid international sanctions for religious and human rights 
suppression.  Many of Vietnam’s harsh command economy and autocratic policies did 
not endear Vietnam to the international community—in particular human rights and 
freedom of religion.  To show that Vietnam was a serious international actor who 
subscribed to the same norms and values as others in the international community, 
Vietnam began using rhetoric which embraced freedom of religion. 
Vietnam also sought to initiate dialogue and establish relations with all friendly 
states—including the Vatican.  Although the Vatican and Vietnam have not yet 
established formal diplomatic relations, many improvements in the government’s view 
and treatment of the Catholic Church have been greatly influenced by 15 years of 
dialogue.  Through Vatican lobbying, the Vietnamese government successfully built a 
nascent relationship of trust with the Catholic hierarchy, and most significantly, Vatican 
officials were able to persuade Vietnamese officials to permit much needed ordinations. 
The Catholic Church and other religious institutions in Vietnam continue to face 
persecutions and restrictions.  However, if a religious group works with the government, 
then that group can receive permission for religious functions and activities.  When 
religion is connected with open criticism of the government, the VCP interprets the 
criticism as a threat to the Party’s dominance and synonymously a threat to national 
security.  For Catholics and other religions willing to work within the system, there is 
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much improved ability to express and practice religion.  For those who openly oppose the 
government, the government severely restricts and suppresses them.  Mixing politics with 
religion in Vietnam is an open invitation to be suppressed. 
My case study has shown that Vietnam's overall view and treatment of the 
Catholic Church has improved since Vietnam emerged from autarky and began 
embracing global integration.  The process has been slow, but improvements have taken 
place.  United States policy makers must continue to take this into account when 
establishing policy for Vietnam.  Policy makers must be willing to demonstrate patience 
and allow for the situation in Vietnam to improve slowly as Vietnam continues to 
integrate further into the international economy and community.     
There are two basic approaches to dealing with religious freedom in Vietnam: 
first, engage Vietnam and by so doing draw it into further international interdependence; 
second, isolate them through coercive and punitive measures.  This thesis has shown that 
when Vietnam was in a condition of autarky, isolation, severe restrictions and control or 
religious institutions resulted in a egregious lack of religious freedom.  The condition we 
see Vietnam presently in—international integration—has coincided with many 
improvements to Vietnam's view and treatment of religion.  Thus, to further religious 
freedom in Vietnam, policy makers should implement policies that will engage Vietnam 
and move it towards increased international interdependence.  In a larger context, when 
dealing with regimes who do not march in step with internationally accepted democratic 
norms policy makers must consider whether to use means of engagement and economic 
incentives to promote liberal values and standards, or uses to punitive methods such as 
sanctions to force a regime to acquiesce to new norms and abrogate the old.  
Engagement, which increases a country's degree of interdependence in the global 
community, makes it more difficult for non-democratic regimes with post-totalitarian 
characteristics to successfully enforce non-democratic autocratic policies—specifically 
towards religion.   
How does this hypothesis apply regarding U.S. policy towards Vietnam?  Michael 
Young, the Chairman of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom,  in a 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee testified that, “increased trade 
has not led to progress in the area of protecting human rights and basic liberties.  And 
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quiet diplomacy alone has not produced tangible results.”270  However, my findings 
suggests that his argument is only partly correct, that there has been progress in 
protecting religious freedom in Vietnam.   Overall, since Vietnam began substantially 
integrating and trading internationally in 1987, some progress has come about, though 
overtly political and ethnically based, religious groups have experienced suppression 
after 2001.271  Young is correct to state that “quite diplomacy alone” is ineffective in 
bringing about positive changes.  So what needs to be done?   
In 2004, Vietnam was designated by the State Department a “country of particular 
concern (CPC).”  The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 allows the State 
Department to designate a country a CPC if that country meets certain criteria.  The CPC 
designation was designed to be a flexible diplomatic tool.  It provides the President with 
an array of options to address abuses of religious freedom.272  In addition to sending a 
strong signal that U.S. interests include freedom of religion, the designation also gives the 
President or the Secretary of State the authority to use sanctions to address severe abuses 
of religious freedom.  The use, or even threat or sanctions is a slippery slope, as they may 
push a country towards isolationism.  Neither do they engage nor increase 
interdependency.  For this reason, the United States should not implement or even 
threaten sanctions.  Rather than punish, the United States should reward for positive 
behavior and generally encourage extensive contacts and interactions with Vietnam.   The 
U.S. should sponsor more exchange programs within Vietnamese business, education, 
government, and military.   
                                                 
270 U.S. Congress.  Senate.  Committee on Foreign Relations, Trade and Human Rights: The Future of 
U.S.-Vietnamese Relations: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 
12 February 2004.  Testimony of Michael Young, Chairman, The U.S. Commission on International 
Religious Freedom; viewed at http://www.uscirf.gov/hearings/12Feb04/Brownback.php3?mode=print; 
Internet; viewed on 20 January 2005 
271 These groups are especially problematic, as mentioned in my introduction, when differentiating 
between the suppression of religious freedom and the suppression of anti-regime elements.  Some of the 
protestant churches among the central highlands ethnic minorities are directly affiliated separatist groups 
seeking an autonomous state.  The Vietnamese government is not unjustly suspicious of protestant house 
church’s among ethnic minority groups in the central highlands of facilitating anti-regime sentiments and 
separatists movements.   
272 U.S. Congress.  Senate.  Committee on Foreign Relations, Trade and Human Rights: The Future of 
U.S.-Vietnamese Relations: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 
12 February 2004.  Testimony of Michael Young. 
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The United States must continue to engage Vietnam and avoid actions which 
would turn Vietnam towards the dark condition of isolation.  As shown here, the Catholic 
Church’s overall degree of religious freedom was greater during Vietnam’s period of 
international integration than during its previous period of autarky.  A primary reason for 
the increased degree of religious freedom experience by the Catholic Church came as a 
result of Vietnam’s increased global interdependence and resulting sensitivity to 
international norms and standards.  The Catholic Church’s experience in Vietnam during 
periods or autarky and interdependence suggests that, as an autocratic state becomes 
increasingly globally integrated and internationally interdependent, a nascent civil society 
will begin to evolve and society in general will tend to liberalize under the new global 
pressures and influences.  International engagement and outreach is most likely to foster 
that trend.   
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